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TOWARD A MORE STRATEGIC
NATIONAL STOCKPILE
by: Troy A. Rule*
ABSTRACT
The COVID–19 pandemic exposed major deficiencies in the United States’
approach to stockpiling for emergencies. States, cities, and hospitals across the
country had meager inventories of critical medical items on hand when the
pandemic first reached U.S. soil, and the federal government’s Strategic National Stockpile proved far too small to serve the country’s needs in the first
several months of the crisis. As nationwide shortages spread, many state governments were compelled to bid against each other to procure scarce medical
supplies—a distribution approach that disadvantaged low-income and minority communities and left countless healthcare professionals and staff illequipped to protect themselves against a deadly virus. These severe supply
shortages, which hindered the country’s early pandemic response, have since
generated an unprecedented push to reform the nation’s stockpiling policy
structure. This Article uses a simple cost-benefit model to highlight shortcomings in the existing U.S. stockpiling policy regime and to identify specific avenues for addressing them. Among other things, U.S. stockpiling policies need
to better account for important differences in the rotatability of supplies and
should incentivize more private stockpiling of the most rotatable emergency
items. Targeted reforms of commandeering laws and price-gouging restrictions could further strengthen private incentives to stockpile and may even
help to clarify how states and the federal government share responsibilities in
the nation’s stockpiling effort. And much more federal support is needed to
incentivize the build-out and maintenance of domestic supply chains for the
least-rotatable emergency goods. Such tailoring of policies and programs to
better fit the unique attributes of stockpiling activities can help ensure the nation is far better equipped to respond the next time disaster strikes.

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. A PRIMER ON U.S. STOCKPILING POLICIES . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Federal Stockpiling Programs: A Historical
Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Evolving Stockpiles of Military Equipment,
Food, and Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Emergency Medical Supplies: The Strategic
National Stockpile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Spotty State-Level Stockpiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Shrinking Private Stockpiles and Growing Reliance
on Foreign Supply Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. COVID–19’S IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL STOCKPILES . . .
A. Crippling Shortages and Soaring Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51
52

R
R

53

R

53

R

57
59

R
R

60
61
62

R
R
R

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V9.I1.2
* Professor of Law and Joseph M. Feller Memorial Chair, Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.

49

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL102.txt

50

unknown

Seq: 2

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

15-NOV-21

13:18

[Vol. 9

1. Confusion Over the Federal Government’s
Stockpiling Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
2. Expired or Defective SNS Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64
3. Price Controls and Bidding Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65
4. Socially Unjust Distribution Outcomes . . . . . . . . .
67
5. Political Favoritism and Punishing of the Most
Prepared States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
69
B. Below-Market Compensation for Commandeered
Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70
1. Legally Prescribed Under-Compensation . . . . . . .
70
2. Indirect Under-Compensation Due to Price
Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
71
C. Calls for New Medical Stockpiling Policies . . . . . . . . . .
73
IV. MODELING STOCKPILING INCENTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
75
A. The Costs of Stockpiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77
1. Warehousing Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77
2. Opportunity Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
78
3. Depreciation Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
79
4. Total Per-Unit Stockpiling Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
80
B. Factors Affecting the Expected Benefits of
Stockpiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
80
1. The Stockpiler’s Rotation Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . .
82
2. The Stockpiled Item’s Anticipated Emergency
Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
86
3. The Probability of a Crisis Requiring the
Stockpiled Item . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
86
4. The Stockpiler’s Risk Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
88
C. Applying the Cost-Benefit Model to Critique Existing
Stockpiling Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
89
1. Over-Centralized Stockpiling of Rotatable
Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
89
2. Price-Gouging and Commandeering Laws That
Weaken Incentives to Stockpile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
91
3. Diminished Stockpiling Incentives Due to
Misconceptions About the SNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
94
4. Under-Investment in Domestic Supply Chains
for Less-Rotatable Emergency Items . . . . . . . . . . .
95
V. REFORMING THE U.S. STOCKPILING POLICY
STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
96
A. Stockpiling Tax Credits for Rotatable Emergency
Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97
1. Structuring the Credits to Promote Continuous
Stockpiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
98
2. Calculating the Credits and Their Cost . . . . . . . . . 100
B. Special Commandeering Rules for STC-Registered
Stockpiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL102.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 3

15-NOV-21

A MORE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE

1. Requiring Enhanced Compensation for Seized
Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Clarified Federal and State Government Roles .
C. Maintaining Domestic Supply Chains for Essential
Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.

13:18

51
102
103

R
R

104
107

R
R

INTRODUCTION

Inadequate stockpiles of certain medical items within the United
States greatly hindered the nation’s initial response to the novel
coronavirus (“COVID–19”) pandemic. In particular, nationwide
shortages of N95 respirator face masks, disposable gloves and gowns,
and other personal protective equipment (“PPE”) made it difficult for
healthcare professionals across the United States to fully protect
themselves while treating infected patients.1 For the country’s heroic
frontline medical workers, the impacts of these shortages were devastating: During the pandemic’s first year, the virus claimed the lives of
more than 3,600 U.S. doctors, nurses, and other healthcare staff with a
large percentage of those deaths occurring within the first three
months of the outbreak.2
The medical supply shortages that plagued the United States during
early stages of the COVID–19 pandemic exposed major shortcomings
in the country’s approach to stockpiling emergency goods. Stockpiled
supplies can be vital not only during pandemics but also during a wide
array of other potential national emergencies, including natural disasters, chemical or biological attacks, and military conflicts. And although the Strategic National Stockpile, the Defense Production Act,
and certain other existing federal policies aided the nation’s response
to COVID–19, these tools also clearly fell short in multiple ways. As
the United States struggles to emerge from a devastating pandemic
while also facing mounting climate change impacts and rising geopolitical instability, the need for more cost-effective and dependable stockpiling policies has never been greater. Fortunately, there are
affordable ways to improve the U.S. stockpiling structure so that the
country is far better equipped for future emergencies.
This Article uses a simple abstract cost-benefit model to analyze the
current U.S. stockpiling policy regime and to identify specific strategies for reforming it. Part II of this Article gives a detailed overview of
existing stockpiling-related policies within the United States. Part III
describes how deficiencies in this policy regime have impaired the nation’s response to the COVID–19 pandemic. Part IV sets forth and
1. See Our Key Findings About US Healthcare Worker Deaths in the Pandemic’s
First Year, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2021, 8:59), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/nginteractive/2020/dec/22/lost-on-the-frontline-our-findings-to-date [https://perma.cc/
BDF3-68W8] [hereinafter Deaths in the Pandemic’s First Year].
2. See id.
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applies a basic cost-benefit model for stockpiling activities to highlight
specific defects in the country’s existing stockpiling structure. Part V
then argues that the enactment of a new federal stockpiling tax credit
program and certain changes to existing commandeering laws could
affordably address many of these deficiencies. By strengthening incentives for cities, states, and businesses to voluntarily assist in the national stockpiling effort, such reforms could enable the United States
to cost effectively sustain a much more robust and reliable stockpiling
system.
II. A PRIMER

ON

U.S. STOCKPILING POLICIES

Stockpiling—the accumulation of large reserves of goods to guard
against major supply or demand shocks—is seldom spotlighted in the
legal academic literature but has been practiced for centuries in nations across the world. In the United States, the evolution of stockpiling policies has largely been reactive: The country’s greatest
stockpiling policy advancements have occurred in the wake of national crises when shortages of certain goods have inflicted widespread harms. As devastating as the COVID–19 pandemic has been, it
has generated another such opportunity for the country to take major
steps forward in stockpiling policy.
Human civilizations have been collaboratively storing food or other
goods for emergency use for thousands of years.3 One of the most
familiar accounts of ancient stockpiling appears in the biblical story of
Joseph of Egypt. After Joseph interpreted the Pharaoh’s dream as
foretelling seven years of plentiful harvests followed by seven years of
famine, the Pharaoh appointed Joseph to oversee an ambitious grain
stockpiling initiative that ultimately spared countless lives.4 The ancient Chinese had also established an elaborate food reserve system
by 54 B.C.,5 some of which eventually inspired similar food stockpiling
initiatives in the United States.6
Stockpiling is inherently at odds with the efficiency-driven, lean-inventory mindset of modern corporate America, which is precisely why
stockpiling policies are more crucial now than ever before. Most manufacturers today rely on complex supply chains to source materials
3. For an insightful primer on the history of stockpiling and theories about its
possible impacts on the emergence of human civilizations and its continued importance as a buffer against economic and societal disruptions, see generally Andreas
Folkers, Freezing Time, Preparing for the Future: The Stockpile as a Temporal Matter
of Security, 50 SEC. DIALOGUE 493, 493 (2019).
4. See Genesis 41:1–57.
5. Derk Bodde, Henry A. Wallace and the Ever-Normal Granary, 5 FAR E.Q.
411, 413 (1946).
6. For a description of how the ancient Chinese influenced Henry Wallace’s development of the “Ever-Normal Granary” program during the Depression Era, see
infra discussion accompanying notes 12–15.
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from hundreds or even thousands of suppliers from across the world,7
and many parties along those elaborate chains strive to avoid keeping
excess inventories on hand to maximize profits.8 However, as the
COVID–19 pandemic’s severe shortages have shown, this increasingly
international, penny-pinching corporate culture can also make the nation much more vulnerable during major crises. Reshaping laws to
adapt to these societal shifts is possible but first requires a basic grasp
of the history and present landscape of U.S. stockpiling policy.
A. Federal Stockpiling Programs: A Historical Perspective
The U.S. government has been stockpiling large quantities of emergency goods for less than a century, and its commitment to stockpiling
has waxed and waned dramatically across that short period. Unfortunately, the federal government’s lukewarm stockpiling efforts over the
years have been far better than those of most states and local governments. The following subsections outline the evolution and primary
features of stockpiling programs in the United States, which today
cover a diverse array of essential materials and supplies.
1. Evolving Stockpiles of Military Equipment, Food, and Oil
The U.S. government first began substantially stockpiling goods in
the 1920s as part of a new military readiness strategy after the nation
suffered under devastating shortages of certain materials during
World War I.9 Then, in 1939, Congress built significantly upon that
initial stockpiling effort by enacting the “Strategic Materials Act,”
which allocated $100 million toward the development of a national
store of critical wartime production materials—an initiative that continues today through the National Defense Stockpile.10 Among other
things, this massive stockpile holds more than $1 billion in rare metals
critical to the manufacture of various military items.11
7. Leonard Read’s famous essay, I, Pencil: My Family Tree as Told to Leonard E.
Read, masterfully describes the remarkable coordinating power of modern capitalistic
markets. See generally Leonard E. Read, I, Pencil: My Family Tree as Told to Leonard
E. Read, FREEMAN, Dec. 1958, at 32.
8. Even end-users such as hospitals have increasingly embraced just-in-time inventory methods to increase profits in recent years. See Chuck Green, Hospitals Turn
to Just-in-Time Buying to Control Supply Chain Costs, HEALTHCARE FIN. (May 6,
2015), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/hospitals-turn-just-time-buyingcontrol-supply-chain-costs [https://perma.cc/C8PF-CZ5W].
9. COMM. ON ASSESSING THE NEED FOR A DEF. STOCKPILE, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, MANAGING MATERIALS FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MILITARY 133 (2008)
(describing establishment of the War Department’s Army and Navy Munitions Board
in 1922).
10. Id. at 134.
11. See Strategic Materials, DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY, https://www.dla.mil/HQ/Acquisition/StrategicMaterials/About/OurOffices/ [https://perma.cc/KAH7-92VB]
(describing how the Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Materials provides “sound
stewardship” for the National Defense Stockpile by storing “[forty-two] commodities
with a current market value of over $1.1 billion,” which includes “zinc, cobalt, and
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Although the U.S. government has also maintained vast reserves of
grain and other food commodities for most of the past century, it recently ended its storage of food reserves. The country’s first major
governmental food storage program—the “Ever-Normal Granary”—
was conceived during the Great Depression Era by Henry A. Wallace,
who served as the Secretary of Agriculture under President Franklin
D. Roosevelt.12 Secretary Wallace attributed his inspiration for the national granary to the Chinese, who had first instituted a similar grain
storage program almost two millennia earlier.13 The enormous grain
reserves of the Ever-Normal Granary were thought of as a tool for
stabilizing food commodity prices and thus were not primarily used
for protection against emergency shortages.14 Nonetheless, supplies
stockpiled under the program proved extremely valuable during multiple national crises.15 Congress eventually replaced the Ever-Normal
Granary with other food stockpiling programs, including the Food Security Wheat Reserve16 and then the Food Security Commodity Reserve.17 However, in the 1990s, Congress converted the nation’s food
reserve into the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (“Trust”), a food
aid program focused mainly on responding to crises overseas.18 And in
2008, the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) sold
off all remaining food in the Trust, leaving the nation today with no

chromium” as well as “more precious metals such as platinum, palladium, and iridium”); Anshu Siripurapu, The State of U.S. Strategic Stockpiles, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELS., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/state-us-strategic-stockpiles (June 15, 2020,
11:04 AM) [https://perma.cc/NH32-DU5V].
12. Joseph S. Davis, The Economics of the Ever-Normal Granary, 20 J. FARM
ECON. 8, 8 (1938) (describing Henry Wallace’s longtime interest in the idea of an
ever-normal granary upon entering Roosevelt’s cabinet and characterizing the idea as
Wallace’s “brain-child”).
13. See Bodde, supra note 5, at 411–13 (quoting a Henry Wallace letter stating that
he first encountered the idea of an “ever-normal granary” when reading a doctoral
thesis that described the use of such a system under that name in China in 54 B.C.).
14. See id. at 420–21 (listing the five functions of the Ever-Normal Granary program, which included “[p]romoting efficient production” and “[b]alancing the flow of
market supplies”).
15. Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural Philosophies and Policies in the New Deal, 68
MINN. L. REV. 333, 347 (1983) (noting that the “larger-than-normal stock” accumulated under the Ever-Normal Granary program “proved advantageous” during World
War II and “in the mid-1970s when foreign countries purchased unprecedented
amounts of our grain and cotton, emptying our larder”).
16. See Food Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-494, 94 Stat.
2575 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1736f–1).
17. See Food Security Commodity Reserve Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110
Stat. 959 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1736f–1).
18. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f–1; see generally The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust,
USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/bill-emerson-humanitarian-trust (Aug. 14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7YRP-DGSQ] (“The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust . . . allows [the] Office of Food for Peace [ ] to respond to
unanticipated food crises abroad, when other . . . resources are not available.”).
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federal grain reserves—a vulnerability that has drawn scorn from
some food security advocates.19
By contrast, the U.S. government is presently maintaining enormous petroleum reserves. Congress authorized the creation of the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (“SPR”) in the mid-1970s in the aftermath of the historically disruptive 1973 Arab Oil Embargo.20 The SPR
has an oil storage capacity of roughly 714 million barrels, which is kept
in underground salt caverns along the Gulf Coast.21 This vast storage
space was already nearly 90% full as of April 2020 with about 635
million barrels stored,22 and weakened oil demand during the
COVID–19 pandemic only increased the U.S. oil reserves even further.23 The national average price for unleaded fuel fell below $2 per
gallon in April 2020—a full dollar lower than just a year earlier—and
at one point, futures contract prices for West Texas Intermediate oil
even dipped briefly into negative territory.24 In an effort to help relieve the supply glut, the Trump Administration went so far as to lease
tens of millions of barrels of SPR storage capacity to nine private oil
companies—a move that frustrated some industry groups that claimed
it was an unfair subsidy that disadvantaged private petroleum storage

19. See Sue Kirchhoff, Surplus U.S. Food Supplies Dry Up, ABC NEWS (May 3,
2008, 10:15 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=4770135&page=1 [https://
perma.cc/M46L-DQ88] (describing how a “coalition of religious and farm groups”
had sent an “open letter to Congress . . . warn[ing] that low [food] supplies increase
the risk of hunger and . . . calling for creation of a strategic grain reserve”).
20. See Off. of Fossil Energy, Strategic Petroleum Reserve Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-re
serves/strategic-petroleum-reserve/spr-quick-facts-and-faqs [https://perma.cc/6NXYCBME]; see also Oil Embargo, 1973–74, OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/
milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo [https://perma.cc/U9YN-PD4B] (“The 1973 Oil
Embargo acutely strained a U.S. economy that had grown increasingly dependent on
foreign oil.”).
21. See PHILLIP BROWN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, CONGRESS.GOV 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/IN/IN11373 (June 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/DX6Y-6GZH]; Off. of Fossil Energy
& Carbon Mgmt., Strategic Petroleum Reserve: About the SPR, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY,
https://www.energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-reserves/strategic-petroleum-reserve
[https://perma.cc/WE7Y-QT4J].
22. See BROWN, supra note 21, at 1.
23. Grant Smith & Julian Lee, Historic Oil Glut Amassed in the Pandemic Almost
Gone, BLOOMBERG: MKTS., https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-18/historic-oil-glut-amassed-during-the-pandemic-has-almost-gone (Apr. 21, 2021, 2:25
AM) [https://perma.cc/D7Z4-DPPG].
24. See Peter Sblendorio, Gas Selling for Under $1 per Gallon in 13 States as National Prices Plummet During Coronavirus Quarantines, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 19,
2020, 6:24 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/coronavirus/ny-coronavirus-gas-prices20200419-6uvja5pxbvaxtozm4l3372aewy-story.html [https://perma.cc/WW5Q-55LG];
Pippa Stevens, ‘Scary,’ ‘Visceral,’ ‘Unprecedented’: Traders Describe Oil’s Wild Week
and Fall to Negative Prices, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/25/scary-visceralunprecedented-traders-describe-oils-wild-week-and-fall-to-negative-prices.html (Apr.
27, 2020, 9:17 AM) [https://perma.cc/KZD6-ZWVC].

R
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companies.25 These leases, together with the U.S. government’s leasing of millions of barrels of space to the Australian government,
brought the SPR very close to full capacity.26
One unique element of the U.S. oil-stockpiling policy is its international commitment to maintain a certain minimum inventory level.
For more than forty-five years, the United States has been a member
of the International Energy Agency (“IEA”), a coalition of roughly
thirty countries designed to promote a more secure global oil supply.27
All IEA member countries have joined the “Agreement on an International Energy Programme,” which obligates each member country
to maintain a stockpile of oil equal “to at least [ninety] days of net oil
imports.”28 After a major global oil supply shock, IEA members can
assent to the coordinated release of stockpiled oil to alleviate
shortages.29 Interestingly, although some food security advocates have
called for a similar global food reserve program, there is presently no
international group akin to the IEA focused on preventing global
shortages of food or medical supplies.30
25. See Timothy Gardner, Laila Kearney & Laura Sanicola, Nine Companies Rent
U.S. Emergency Oil Reserve Space for 23 Mln Barrels: Official, REUTERS, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-global-oil-usa-spr/nine-companies-rent-23-million-barrelsworth-of-space-in-us-emergency-oil-reserve-official-idUSKBN22C03Q (Apr. 29, 2020,
7:54 PM) [https://perma.cc/HYB5-2WV9] (quoting an industry group letter alleging
that the Trump Administration’s leasing of SPR space to private companies “constitutes a subsidized storage service that could place private commercial storage operators at a competitive disadvantage”).
26. See Sonali Paul, Australia to Spend $60 Million Buying Oil to Store in U.S.
Reserve, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-oil/australia-to-spend60-million-buying-oil-to-store-in-us-reserve-idUSKCN2240AA (Apr. 21, 2020, 10:07
PM) [https://perma.cc/K4JP-XD9J].
27. See Membership, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/about/membership (Jan. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/32HZ-XFAS]; United States, MISSION INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/countries/united-states [https://perma.cc/G5SBLDJM]; INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/about/mission (NOV. 26, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/EBF2-245N].
28. See Oil Security, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/areas-of-work/
ensuring-energy-security/oil-security (Nov. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/JSE6-EAEU].
29. See id.
30. E.g., Corazon T. Aragon, The United Nations Must Manage a Global Food
Reserve, U.N. CHRON., https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/united-nations-mustmanage-global-food-reserve [https://perma.cc/84PK-BHRP] (describing certain regional rice reserve programs and arguing that climate change and reductions in agricultural land are creating a need for the United Nations to create and govern a
regional or global food reserve). But see Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga & H.E. Juan
Ramón de la Fuente, Mexico’s Initiative to Ensure Global Access to Medicines, Vaccines and Medical Equipment to Face COVID19, JUST SEC. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://
www.justsecurity.org/69916/mexicos-initiative-to-ensure-global-access-to-medicinesvaccines-and-medical-equipment-to-face-covid19/ [https://perma.cc/M6AY-TJ66]
(describing a United Nations resolution to promote international cooperation during
COVID–19 by “ensuring fair access to medicines, vaccines[,] and equipment, [and]
preventing speculation and undue stockpiling that may hinder access to these essential materials”).
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2. Emergency Medical Supplies: The Strategic National Stockpile
Less than a quarter century ago, Congress finally added medical
supplies to the federal government’s list of significantly stockpiled
items by authorizing the build-out of a reserve now known as the Strategic National Stockpile (“SNS”). The SNS traces its origins to a federal bioterrorism preparedness program instituted by the Clinton
administration in the late 1990s.31 In 1999, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”), operating under U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) oversight, established and
began managing the “National Pharmaceutical Stockpile”—a program
focused primarily on storing medical items that would be critical for
responding to a major biological attack.32
Congress broadened the scope of the nation’s medical supply stockpile shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks to cover a wider range of
potential threats, and the stockpile’s mission has gradually continued
to expand since that time. Provisions in the Bioterrorism Response
Act of 2002 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 rebranded the
program as the “Strategic National Stockpile.”33 Provisions in that
legislation also expressly widened the scope of the program’s mission,
directing the SNS to provide “for the emergency health security of the
United States, including the emergency health security of children and
other vulnerable populations.”34 The SNS initially stockpiled mostly
antitoxins, vaccines, antibiotics, nerve agent antidotes, and other
highly specialized medicines that would be valuable if there were a
major chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive attack
on U.S. soil.35 Over time, however, the SNS began fulfilling increas31. See Ryan R. Kemper, Responding to Bioterrorism: An Analysis of Titles I and
II of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 385, 393–94 (2005).
32. Id. The Public Health Service Act has long authorized HHS to declare and
assist in federal responses to public health emergencies. See Public Health Service
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d.
33. See Kemper, supra note 31, at 394 n.43 (citing Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 121, 116
Stat. 594, 611–13 (2002), and Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
§ 503(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2213 (2002)).
34. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 121, 116 Stat. 594, 612 (2002); see also Lindsay F. Wiley,
Adaptation to the Health Consequences of Climate Change as a Potential Influence on
Public Health Law and Policy: From Preparedness to Resilience, 15 WIDENER L. REV.
483, 503 (2010) (“Notably, Congress gave the SNS a considerably broader mission
than the [National Pharmaceutical Stockpile] . . . .”).
35. NAT’L BIODEFENSE SCI. BD. & OFF. OF PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE BD. OF SCI. COUNS., ANTICIPATED RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (SNS) IN THE YEAR 2020: AN EXAMINATION WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 1, https://www.phe.gov/
Preparedness/legal/boards/nbsb/recommendations/Documents/nbsb-bsc-sns-2020-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K52B-P5DD]; Nell Greenfieldboyce, Why Even a Huge
Medical Stockpile Will Be of Limited Use Against COVID-19, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA
(Mar. 15, 2020, 11:39 AM), https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/npr/2020/03/15/
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ingly vital roles in federal responses to other types of emergencies,
including hurricanes, earthquakes, and outbreaks of viruses such as
H1N1, Ebola, and the Zika virus.36 As the mission of the SNS
changed, its burgeoning inventory of more than 1,000 different types
of medical supplies also evolved to include significantly more nonpharmaceutical goods, including greater quantities of PPE.37
When COVID–19 reached the United States in early 2020, a handful of undisclosed and presumably guarded warehouses throughout
the country housed much of the federal government’s $8 billion SNS
inventory.38 A small fraction of the SNS’s inventory has long been
stored in “push packages”—fifty-ton collections of life-saving items
that are supposedly capable of being delivered to any part of the U.S.
within twelve hours.39 Most of the remaining inventory is stored by
the SNS directly or by private vendors or manufacturers under government contracts.40 According to one report, a substantial proportion
814121891/why-even-a-huge-medical-stockpile-will-be-of-limited-use-against-covid19/ [https://perma.cc/TM5C-6VYR].
36. Greenfieldboyce, supra note 35; Shannon Pettypiece, Trump’s Use of Medical
Stockpile Veers from Past Administrations, Leaving States in the Lurch, NBC NEWS,
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-s-use-medical-stockpile-veerspast-administrations-leaving-state-n1177786 (Apr. 6, 2020, 6:59 PM) [https://perma.cc/
ZV9Y-M8PF].
37. See Farhad Manjoo, How the World’s Richest Country Ran Out of a 75-Cent
Face Mask, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/opinion/
coronavirus-face-mask.html [https://perma.cc/4TY5-WP5Z] (noting that Congress approved funding in 2006 to add tens of millions of N95 masks and other PPE to the
SNS); Lena H. Sun, Inside the Secret U.S. Stockpile Meant to Save Us All in a Bioterror Attack, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/to-your-health/wp/2018/04/24/inside-the-secret-u-s-stockpile-meant-to-save-usall-in-a-bioterror-attack/ [https://perma.cc/W7T6-BCES] (reporting that the SNS “inventory exceeds 1,000 categories of drugs and other items”).
38. Nell Greenfieldboyce, Inside a Secret Government Warehouse Prepped for
Health Catastrophes, NPR (June 27, 2016, 4:56 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2016/06/27/483069862/inside-a-secret-government-warehouse-preppedfor-health-catastrophes [https://perma.cc/5LKC-GDVP] (“The location of these warehouses is secret. How many there are is secret. (Although a former government official recently said at a public meeting that there are six.) And exactly what’s in them is
secret.”); Melissa Quinn, What You Need to Know About the Strategic National Stockpile, CBS NEWS (Apr. 7, 2020, 4:17 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/q-a-withgreg-burel-former-director-of-the-strategic-national-stockpile/ [https://perma.cc/
8PEA-WS9G] (quoting former SNS director Greg Burel as describing the stockpile as
an “$8 billion inventory of various materials, including things like antibiotics, antitoxins, antidotes, vaccines, medical surgical material, [and] federal medical stations” as
well as “ventilators and other products”).
39. Don Reisinger, What’s in the Strategic National Stockpile, the US Reserve of
Life-Saving Materials Stashed in Secret Warehouses That Experts Worry Isn’t Big
Enough, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2020, 4:40 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
strategic-national-stockpile-location-items-inside-history-size-2020-4 [https://
perma.cc/EF2S-W3ZM].
40. Chem. Hazards Emergency Med. Mgmt., Strategic National Stockpile, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://chemm.nlm.nih.gov/sns.htm (Oct. 7, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/SUA2-ZNV4]; STEPHEN D. PRIOR, NAT’L SEC. HEALTH POL’Y CTR.,
WHO YOU GONNA CALL?: RESPONDING TO A MEDICAL EMERGENCY WITH THE
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of the stockpile is in “vendor managed inventor[ies]” that are “under
the control and management of selected, pre-qualified vendors” and
“designed to arrive [twenty-four to thirty-six] hours after SNS deployment,” suggesting that often the SNS does not physically possess supplies that respond to certain threats.41 However, the agency does
maintain ownership of even these third-party-managed inventory
items.42
In the decade preceding the COVID–19 outbreak, SNS inventories
for certain key stockpile items slowly depleted as funding flattened
and the federal government deployed SNS supplies for emergencies
but never restocked them. For instance, even though the SNS distributed large quantities of PPE and other pandemic-related emergency
supplies in response to the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, Congress never appropriated funding to replace items used in that effort.43 In fact, from
2010 to 2018, federal appropriations for the SNS hovered between
$477 and $596 million even though the SNS distributed tens of millions of dollars’ worth of supplies in response to multiple disasters
during those years.44
B. Spotty State-Level Stockpiling
Although state governments tend to be much better than the federal government at stashing away cash for rainy days,45 most states
have historically been relatively poor stockpilers of essential goods.
STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE, DEF. TECH. INFO. CTR. 4 (June 2004), https://
apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a476356.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4S7-4CMK].
41. PRIOR, supra note 40, at 4.
42. See Chem. Hazards Emergency Med. Mgmt., supra note 40.
43. Quinn, supra note 38.
44. See Dinah Voyles Pulver & Erin Mansfield, Rare Look at Stockpile Handouts
Shows Which States Got Ventilators, Masks Amid Coronavirus, USA TODAY, https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2020/04/10/rare-look-stockpile-showswhich-states-got-supplies-amid-covid/5126900002/ (Apr. 10, 2020, 11:23 AM) [https://
perma.cc/37DP-XRCN] (reporting that the “stockpile’s budget reached a high of $596
million in 2010, then dropped year after year until reaching a low of $477 million in
2013” and that although “[m]uch of the funding was restored the following year, . . .
the budget stayed flat at about $575 million through 2018”).
45. See Jared Walczak & Janelle Cammenga, State Rainy Day Funds and the
COVID-19 Crisis, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/state-rainyday-funds-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/48P8-K7RV] (detailing the revenue stabilization
funds of U.S. states, which had balances with a median of 8% of states’ general fund
expenditures as of early 2020). In contrast, the U.S. government has not balanced its
budget for nearly two decades and had accumulated debts exceeding $26 trillion by
June 2020. Joseph Zeballos-Roig, The National Debt Tops $26 Trillion for the First
Time as the Federal Government Ramps Up Coronavirus Relief Spending, BUS. INSIDER (June 14, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/national-debt-totaltrillion-record-federal-government-coronavirus-spending-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/
64C9-CDED]; Jim Dexter, CNN Fact Check: The Last President to Balance the
Budget, CNN: POL. TICKER (Feb. 3, 2010, 4:36 PM), https://politicalticker.
blogs.cnn.com/2010/02/03/cnn-fact-check-the-last-president-to-balance-the-budget/
[https://perma.cc/635W-M5K3].
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Because responsibility for the national defense resides primarily with
the federal government, states generally do not stockpile large
amounts of military equipment. States also have not historically stockpiled much food or petroleum.
Numerous state governments in the United States do have a history
of stockpiling some emergency medical items, although most of these
state-level stockpiles were comparatively small and had been neglected in the years leading up to the COVID–19 outbreak. One 2008
report noted that there were “robust pharmaceutical stockpiles in
many states” as of that time and that nearly half of states had “ordered [100%] of their calculated antiviral stockpile requirements for
treatment of sick individuals.”46 Over subsequent years, however, numerous state stockpiles gradually degraded to the point that by the
time COVID–19 hit U.S. soil, many of these stockpiles consisted
mostly of expired items the federal government had provided in response to the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak.47 Facing budgetary constraints and a general lack of political support for large government
expenditures to store medical items that may never get used, many
states during the 2010s had increasingly allowed their stockpiles to
wither and seemed content to rely simply on the federal government’s
SNS for backup supplies if a major public health crisis were to ever
arise.48
C. Shrinking Private Stockpiles and Growing Reliance on Foreign
Supply Chains
As government medical stockpiles languished in the years preceding the COVID–19 pandemic, hospitals’ and medical equipment vendors’ growing use of just-in-time inventory methods similarly depleted
private stockpiles. Although there is very limited publicly available
information regarding the inventories of U.S. hospitals and medical
vendors,49 those inventories have long been trending toward danger46. Chris Logan, Pandemic Preparedness in the States: An Assessment of Progress
and Opportunity, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACS. 5 (Sept. 2008),
https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/docs/clearinghouse/best-practices/National_Governors_Association_PANDEMIC_ASSESSMENT_0809.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8LCF-YRUF].
47. See David A. Lieb & Cuneyt Dil, Review: State Stockpiles Were Depleted
Before the Virus, MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/04/23/reviewstate-stockpiles-were-depleted-before-the-virus/ (Apr. 23, 2020, 3:33 PM) [https://
perma.cc/ZSU9-7EGN] (reporting that a “review of more than [twenty] states found
that before the coronavirus outbreak[,] many had at least a modest supply of N95
masks, gowns, gloves[,] and other medical equipment” but that those supplies “were
often well past their expiration dates—left over from the H1N1 influenza outbreak a
decade ago”).
48. See id. (quoting a New Hampshire state health commissioner as conceding that
her state “very much rel[ied] on the national stockpile for anything more than . . . a
week” of stockpiled supplies).
49. See Blake Farmer, Coronavirus Pushes Hospitals to Share Information About
Stocks of Protective Gear, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 13, 2020), https://khn.org/
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ously low levels. Indeed, the potential pandemic-related risks associated with hospitals’ increased use of just-in-time inventory methods
were drawing criticism more than a decade before COVID–19
reached the United States.50
The U.S. healthcare industry’s vulnerability to major supply or demand shocks for essential goods is further aggravated by the fact that
the supply chains for such items are increasingly international in
scope. Tragically, the actual cost savings achieved by importing essential medical supplies rather than manufacturing them domestically are
often modest at best.51
III.

COVID–19’S IMPACT

ON

U.S. MEDICAL STOCKPILES

After under-prioritizing its medical stockpiles for decades, the
United States was abruptly forced to rely on them in early 2020 as
COVID–19 spread rapidly throughout the country. For weeks, numbers of confirmed coronavirus cases, hospitalizations, and deaths rose
exponentially in many parts of the United States.52 Because
COVID–19 is highly contagious, N95 respirator masks, disposable
gloves, face shields, isolation gowns, and other PPE are critical means
of protecting healthcare professionals working near infected patients.53 Ventilators and related supplies are also crucial for treating
the debilitating respiratory symptoms associated with the disease.54
news/coronavirus-pushes-hospitals-to-share-information-about-stocks-of-protectivegear/ [https://perma.cc/SUX9-VNCM] (noting that “no one knows what, beyond [the
SNS], is available in the private sector” and that “[t]he issue is getting hospitals comfortable sharing information about their preparedness—information that, until now,
they have considered confidential”). The CDC has funded a project to develop a nationwide hospital inventory tracking system accessible to CDC officials that would
help address this data gap. See id.
50. See Bernard Wysocki Jr. & Sarah Lueck, Just-in-Time Inventories Make U.S.
Vulnerable in a Pandemic, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB113703203939544469 [https://perma.cc/G3VE-CT2T].
51. See Lauren Feiner, States Are Bidding Against Each Other and the Federal
Government for Important Medical Supplies—and It’s Driving Up Prices, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/09/why-states-and-the-federal-government-are-bidding-on-ppe.html (Apr. 11, 2020, 8:44 AM) [https://perma.cc/E4FP-8WPC] (quoting
Stanford medicine and economics professor Kevin Schulman, who stated that often
U.S. companies save only “pennies . . . by going to international suppliers” for medical masks and similar equipment).
52. For detailed and up-to-date information on the spread of COVID–19 cases
and deaths throughout the United States and throughout the world, see Cumulative
Cases, JOHN HOPKINS U. & MED.: CORONAVIRUS RES. CTR., https://
coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/cumulative-cases (June 17, 2021, 6:49 AM) [https://perma.cc/
LSV9-UW5Q].
53. See COVID-19: Control and Prevention, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/covid-19/controlprevention.html [https://
perma.cc/5JLY-9HYM].
54. A federal executive order and corresponding HHS notice prohibiting the
hoarding of certain COVID–19-related supplies applied, among other things, to “Ventilators . . . ventilator tubing connectors, and ventilator accessories.” See Exec. Order
No. 13910, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,001 (Mar. 23, 2020); see also Notice of Designation of
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And nasopharyngeal swabs were essential in early 2020 for the most
well-developed forms of virus testing at that time.55 Accordingly, demand for these and certain other medical items spiked dramatically in
early 2020 as COVID–19 hospitalizations escalated across the nation.
A. Crippling Shortages and Soaring Prices
When hospitals, state governments, municipalities, and the U.S.
government scrambled in early 2020 to stock up on N95 masks, PPE,
and other essential medical items to respond to the nation’s
COVID–19 outbreak, severe shortages soon crippled markets. Some
opportunistic hoarders hoping to profit from the crisis appear to have
exacerbated the shortage problems.56 Others hoarded supplies out of
fear,57 triggering herding effects that may have made shortages even
worse.58
As the pandemic progressed, shortages of additional types of medical supplies began hampering response efforts. In particular, shortages
of nasopharyngeal swabs, testing media, and other materials slowed
virus infection testing and antibody testing in the United States.59 And
by the summer of 2020, there were also growing concerns that
shortages of certain materials could hinder the country’s ability to vacScarce Materials or Threatened Materials Subject to COVID-19 Hoarding Prevention
Measures, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,592 (Mar. 30, 2020).
55. See Katie Thomas, The Latest Obstacle to Getting Tested? A Shortage of Swabs
and Face Masks, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/health/coronavirustest-shortages-face-masks-swabs.html (July 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/RRR2-G3EE].
56. See, e.g., Rebecca Davis O’Brien, New York Businessman Charged with Price
Gouging on Coronavirus Protective Equipment, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2020, 5:39 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/coronavirus-2020-04-24/card/u7yz8
BUDkdIV9IXeqWrs [https://perma.cc/WV5V-3PDE].
57. See, e.g., Doug Whiteman, ‘No Toilet Paper, Again?!’ Shortages and Hoarding
Pop Up as COVID Delta Surges, YAHOO! (Aug. 22, 2021), https://www.yahoo.com/
now/no-toilet-paper-again-shoppers-235000819.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=
aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAL
du2nywKu57xXpVG8kREc-_jElqCiXjtvQKxsmM0XxYYR9KGEYblSjTUIQYuIS3mM-E_t0R7ZBPmoWKmb3VFC1RGZmfUSwHJGEKLzflwOm2tq1zncG8d8aqrenJYm0WvRkgOt2LTIVbGtLwUXBm221rfsfVX7PdCScnA7uwFu
[https://perma.cc/YR7J-AYJ7].
58. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Climate Triage: A Resources Trust to Address the Inequality
in a Climate-Changed World, 50 ENV’T L. 97, 112–13 (2020) (explaining that “hoarding begets hoarding, so that once it starts, it becomes very difficult to stop” and that
“[e]ven if some selfless individuals refrain at first, their fear will build as they see
others hoarding, in turn creating enormous pressure to join in the hoarding”).
59. Nick Paul Taylor, Widespread Shortages for COVID-19 Test Materials Persist,
Poll Says, MEDTECH DIVE (May 29, 2020), https://www.medtechdive.com/news/widespread-swab-covid-19-test-materials-shortages-persist-poll-says/578831/ [https://
perma.cc/L3M6-34RZ]; see also Katherine J. Wu, ‘It’s Like Groundhog Day’:
Coronavirus Testing Labs Again Lack Key Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/health/coronavirus-testing-supply-shortage.html (Aug.
15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/M32L-TJRW] (“Labs across the country are facing
backlogs in coronavirus testing thanks in part to a shortage of tiny pieces of tapered
plastic.”).
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cinate its population against the virus once researchers developed an
effective COVID–19 vaccine.60
1. Confusion Over the Federal Government’s Stockpiling Role
Many hospitals and state governments across the United States that
had relied on the SNS for backup medical supplies during previous
public health crises expressed frustration when SNS inventories
proved far too meager to support the nation’s response to COVID–19.
The pandemic was so severe and widespread that neither the federal
government, the states, nor the private sector had stockpiled nearly
enough medical supplies to fight it safely and effectively. For instance,
according to one report, when the pandemic broke out on U.S. soil,
the SNS held only about 1% of N95 masks that HHS anticipated the
country would need.61
Not surprisingly, the federal government and various state governments each sought to deflect political blame for the nation’s inadequate medical stockpiles. Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”) Administrator Pete Gaynor advised state and local emergency managers to “not wait for the PPE from the [f]ederal government to show[ ]up” and to instead “[t]ake aggressive action . . . to
source [their] own” supplies.62 When multiple governors railed back
against FEMA’s hands-off approach and asserted that states had
never borne the responsibility to stockpile for emergencies,63 President Trump labeled these governors as “complainers” and quipped
that they “should have been stocked up and ready long before th[e]
crisis hit.”64
The uncertainty over state governments’ share of the national stockpiling duties was particularly obvious in April 2020 when the SNS abruptly revised language on its website. The website had formerly
stated that “[w]hen state, local, tribal, and territorial responders re60. See Sarah Owermohle, The ‘Biggest Challenge’ Won’t Come Until After a
Coronavirus Vaccine Is Found, POLITICO: CORONAVIRUS, https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/05/11/coronavirus-vaccine-supply-shortages-245450 (May 11, 2020, 6:28
PM) [https://perma.cc/RWD2-R45Y] (arguing that the “nation’s supply chain isn’t anywhere close to ready” to produce a COVID–19 vaccine if one is found).
61. Rhea Mahbubani, US Medical Workers Will Need 3.5 Billion Face Masks if the
Coronavirus Reaches Pandemic Status. Right Now, the Country Only Has 1% of That
Number., BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 4, 2020, 4:15 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/usa1-percent-3-billion-face-masks-needed-coronavirus-pandemic-2020-3 [https://
perma.cc/D7TG-TGZK].
62. Pete Gaynor, FEMA Administrator March 27, 2020, Letter to Emergency Managers Requesting Action on Critical Steps, FEMA (Mar. 27, 2020), https://
www.fema.gov/news-release/2020/03/27/fema-administrator-march-27-2020-letteremergency-managers-requesting-action [https://perma.cc/Y35Y-RLBB].
63. See, e.g., Lieb & Dil, supra note 47 (reporting Michigan Governor Gretchen
Whitmer stated that her “state had counted on the federal government to be prepared
for a pandemic” and quoting her stating that it had “never been the role and the
assumption” for states to bear that responsibility).
64. Id.
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quest federal assistance . . ., the stockpile ensures that the right
medicines and supplies get to those who need them most during an
emergency.”65 However, senior Trump advisor Jared Kushner directly
contradicted this language in a White House press briefing, declaring
that the SNS is actually “supposed to be [the federal government’s]
stockpile; it’s not supposed to be states’ stockpiles that they then
use.”66 Within a day after Kushner made this statement, the SNS revised language on its website, recharacterizing the SNS as a mere
“short-term stopgap buffer” intended to “supplement state and local
supplies during public health emergencies.”67 Regardless of whether
these revisions were reasonable, their message was clear: State governments could not rely on the SNS to furnish most of the medical
supplies they would need to address the COVID–19 crisis.
2. Expired or Defective SNS Supplies
Sadly, a significant proportion of the goods the SNS did distribute
to states and localities across the United States during early stages of
the COVID–19 pandemic were in disrepair or were too old for healthcare professionals to safely use. Although some officials have claimed
that the SNS routinely rotates its inventories to prevent such quality
problems,68 reports during the peak of the nationwide shortages described SNS shipments containing thousands of unusable items.69 The
SNS sent roughly 6,000 surgical masks to Alabama in early 2020 that
were severely damaged by dry rot and had 2010 expiration dates.70
HHS also sent 170 ventilators to California that did not work upon
arrival.71 Sources later revealed that the federal government had al65. Daniel Dale, Trump Administration Edits National Stockpile Website a Day
After It Contradicted Jared Kushner, CNN: POL., https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/03/
politics/stockpile-website-edited-kushner-claim/index.html (Apr. 3, 2020, 6:07 PM)
[https://perma.cc/JC23-226S].
66. Ben Gittleson, After Kushner Says ‘It’s Our Stockpile,’ HHS Website Changed
to Echo His Comments on Federal Crisis Role, ABC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2020, 6:50 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/kushner-stockpile-hhs-website-changed-echo-comments-federal/story?id=69936411 [https://perma.cc/5NLA-5GY7].
67. Dale, supra note 65.
68. See, e.g., Reisinger, supra note 39 (quoting former SNS director Greg Burel,
who stated that “SNS material is constantly managed and rotated for disposal when it
is ultimately expired”).
69. See, e.g., Joyce Frieden, Strategic National Stockpile Needs Overhaul,
MEDPAGE TODAY (June 24, 2020), https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/healthpolicy/87244 [https://perma.cc/F3NW-D58D] (quoting New
Hampshire Senator Maggie Hassan during a Senate committee hearing as complaining that many supplies her state’s healthcare workers received from the SNS
during the COVID–19 pandemic “were unusable or were expired”).
70. See, e.g., Kim Chandler, Some States Receive Masks with Dry Rot, Broken Ventilators, AP (Apr. 3, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/kate-brown-virus-outbreak-usnews-ap-top-news-ca-state-wire-f43781b64bacd6aa094d9404f4ab91a4 [https://
perma.cc/W3UT-U349].
71. Sara Murray & Scott Glover, Nation’s Stockpile Proves To Be No Match for a
Pandemic, CNN POL., https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/06/politics/strategic-national-
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lowed a major ventilator maintenance contract to lapse, causing more
than 2,100 SNS ventilators to be unusable when the pandemic broke
out.72 State government officers in Oregon, Colorado, and New
Hampshire also reported receiving medical supplies or equipment
from the SNS that had expired or were not operational.73
The numerous reports of SNS shipments of expired or defective
items during the COVID–19 pandemic corroborate information HHS
officials have since provided regarding the state of the SNS when the
pandemic broke out. Among other things, HHS admitted that roughly
five of the twelve million N95 respirator masks stored in the SNS as of
early 2020 had expired.74 These and other failings prompted sharp
criticism of the SNS from some elected officials over what they have
characterized as ineffective management of federal stockpile
resources.75
3. Price Controls and Bidding Wars
The federal government’s passive approach to the medical supply
shortages that COVID–19 caused also created a disjointed marketplace for these items dominated by price-gouging restrictions and interstate-bidding wars. Several state governments implemented policies
in early 2020 temporarily prohibiting private parties from charging
even modestly increased prices for N95 masks, PPE, and other essential medical goods. Meanwhile, out of desperation, many of these
same state governments ultimately bid and paid astronomically high
prices for such items when the federal government’s reluctance to nationally coordinate the procurement and distribution of supplies pitted states against each other in auction-like bidding battles.76
Price-gouging restrictions imposed in the early stages of the U.S.
COVID–19 pandemic across much of the country outlawed sales of
stockpile-coronavirus-trump-invs/index.html (May 6, 2020, 7:37 PM) [https://
perma.cc/A3JB-78VS] (reporting that “California received 170 ventilators from the
federal stockpile that were not in working condition”).
72. David E. Sanger, Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Nicholas Kulish, A Ventilator Stockpile, with One Hitch: Thousands Do Not Work, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/01/us/politics/coronavirus-ventilators.html (Apr. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
3J4A-B79T].
73. Chandler, supra note 70.
74. Tim Dickinson, The Unmasking of America: How the Trump Administration’s
Negligence Deprived Healthcare Workers of N95 Masks in a Pandemic, ROLLING
STONE (June 11, 2020, 11:56 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/n95-masks-trump-covid19-coronavirus-health-care-workers-ppe-1013132/
[https://perma.cc/M4VE-7NE5].
75. See, e.g., Frieden, supra note 69 and accompanying text.
76. Some politicians sharply criticized the White House’s unwillingness to help
federally govern the procurement and distribution of critical medical items. E.g.,
Pulver & Mansfield, supra note 44 (quoting New York Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney’s assertion that the Trump Administration was “leaving states to fend for themselves, to scour the open market for these scarce supplies, and to compete with each
other and federal agencies in a chaotic, free-for-all bidding war”).
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certain essential medical items at excessively high prices. Several
states have price-gouging statutes on the books that automatically
kick in during declared disasters to prohibit individuals or businesses
from selling certain goods for more than 10 to 25% above pre-disaster
prices.77 State-level enforcement of these price-gouging laws began
applying to essential medical supplies in some states relatively soon
after the pandemic took hold.78 President Trump also issued an executive order in March 2020 authorizing the federal enforcement of pricegouging restrictions,79 and the U.S. Department of Justice clearly signaled its intention to follow the President’s order and police against
such actions.80
Ironically, the price ceilings created under these various price-gouging statutes and orders failed to protect numerous state governments
from paying exorbitantly high prices for some critical medical items.
Once it became clear that the SNS could not furnish adequate quanti77. E.g., ALA. CODE § 8-31 (1975) (setting forth the Alabama Unconscionable
Pricing Act, which prohibits sales at more than 25% above pre-disaster prices during
a declared emergency); OR. REV. STAT. § 401.965 (2009) (delineating Oregon’s emergency price-gouging law, which caps price increases at 15% above the prevailing price
before an abnormal market disruption); CAL. PENAL CODE § 396(e) (West 2021)
(criminalizing sales at prices more than 10% above pre-emergency prices in California). For a more detailed description of state price-gouging restrictions, see generally
John Johnson, George Korenko & Matthew Milner, Are Pandemic Sellers Actually
Violating Price-Gouging Laws?, LAW360 (Apr. 2, 2020, 5:41 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1259189 [https://perma.cc/5TM3-UYFB]. See also Kendra L.
Berardi, Ian T. Clarke-Fisher & Edward J. Heath, Responding to Government Inquires Related to Price Gouging During the COVID-19 Pandemic, NAT’L L. REV.
(Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/responding-to-government-inquires-related-to-price-gouging-during-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/U2X8GHF4] (describing emergency price-gouging restrictions in Connecticut, New York,
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island).
78. As early as March 2020, some state attorneys general were already beginning
to bring enforcement claims against alleged price-gougers. See, e.g., John L. Mone &
Terry Wallace, Price-Gouging Allegation Leaves 750,000 Face Masks in Limbo, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 26, 2020, 8:22 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/price-gouging-allegation-leaves-750000-face-masks-limbo-69826848 [https://perma.cc/G8NBQAF5] (describing the Texas Attorney General Office’s lawsuit against a Houston
auctioneer for arranging auctioned sales of N95 masks at prices well above the prepandemic range).
79. Exec. Order No. 13,910, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,001, § 2(a)(i) (2020) (conferring authority to the HHS Secretary to take actions to prevent the private accumulation of
scarce health and medical resources “for the purpose of resale at prices in excess of
prevailing market prices”).
80. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice and Department of
Health and Human Services Partner to Distribute More Than Half a Million Medical
Supplies Confiscated from Price Gougers (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/department-justice-and-department-health-and-human-services-partner-distributemore-half [https://perma.cc/CA74-4QAL] (quoting U.S. Attorney General William
Barr as stating that “[i]f you are amassing critical medical equipment for the purpose
of selling it at exorbitant prices, you can expect a knock at your door” and that “[t]he
Department of Justice’s COVID-19 Hoarding and Price Gouging Task Force is working tirelessly around the clock . . . to ensure that bad actors cannot illicitly profit from
the COVID-19 pandemic facing our nation”).
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ties of these supplies to the states, many state governments started
competing aggressively against each other and against the federal government to purchase the items from private vendors.81 In this frenzied
environment, bulk prices for essential medical items skyrocketed. For
instance, N95 masks, which had been widely available in bulk for less
than $1 per mask before the COVID–19 outbreak, were selling in
April 2020 for upwards of $8 each.82 State officials in New York were
reportedly paying twenty cents for disposable medical gloves that
would have normally cost them less than five cents.83 And ventilators
that would typically cost about $12,000 each were selling for as much
as $65,000 each.84
4. Socially Unjust Distribution Outcomes
The nation’s widespread intergovernmental bidding wars for scarce
medical items during the early stages of the COVID–19 pandemic
were not only inefficient; they also contributed to the unjust distribution of critical resources during a major public health emergency. As
state and city governments with the greatest buying power bought up
81. David A. Lieb, States Give Few Details on Billions Spent on Virus Supplies, AP
NEWS (May 25, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/mo-state-wire-wa-state-wire-illinoispa-state-wire-virus-outbreak-da2557fb40996097f4dbb927ce5a0a04 [https://perma.cc/
2GBN-UHPH] (reporting that “[s]tates are spending billions of dollars stocking up on
medical supplies such as masks and breathing machines during the coronavirus pandemic” and that many have “set aside purchasing safeguards amid a scramble for
supplies” and are “clos[ing] emergency deals . . . to ensure orders aren’t diverted
elsewhere”); see also Joel Rose, A ‘War’ For Medical Supplies: States Say FEMA Wins
By Poaching Orders, NPR (Apr. 15, 2020, 4:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/15/
835308133/governors-say-fema-is-outbidding-redirecting-or-poaching-their-medicalsupply-or [https://perma.cc/U5C6-8BUU] (claiming that FEMA was outbidding state
and local governments in bidding wars for critical medical supplies and thereby “driving up the price of those supplies for everybody” and that it is “leaving states and
hospitals even more desperate to find what they need”).
82. Feiner, supra note 51 (reporting that state officials in Idaho had seen N95 respirator masks “going for nearly $8 apiece” and that the items would “typically run
about a dollar per mask”); see also Press Release, Anthony Brown, Congressman,
Brown-Warren Introduce Legislation to Nationalize the Medical Supply Chain (May
1, 2020), https://anthonybrown.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=
899 [https://perma.cc/8LSM-UH3G] (citing a recent Society for Healthcare Organization Procurement Professionals study finding that “the cost of N95 masks increased
from $0.38 to $5.75 each (1,513% increase), vinyl exam gloves increased $0.02 to $0.06
(300% increase), isolation gowns increased $0.25 to $5.00 (2000% increase), and reusable face shields increased from $0.50 to $4.00 (900% increase)” during the U.S.
COVID–19 outbreak).
83. Lydia DePillis & Lisa Song, In Desperation, New York State Pays Up to 15
Times the Normal Prices for Medical Equipment, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 2, 2020, 1:20
PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/in-desperation-new-york-state-pays-up-to-15times-the-normal-price-for-medical-equipment [https://perma.cc/4ZK2-JPM7].
84. Courtney Subramanian, How a Frantic Trek to a McDonald’s Parking Lot
Shows the Scramble States Face for Coronavirus Supplies, USA TODAY, https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/18/coronavirus-creates-ppe-biddingwar-states-like-illinois-new-york/5144652002/ (Apr. 19, 2020, 1:51 PM) [https://
perma.cc/8C88-2Y3M].
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supplies, socioeconomically disadvantaged areas across the country—
many of which had large minority group populations—disproportionately suffered.85 The money-driven nature of how essential medical
goods were distributed during the pandemic similarly disadvantaged
smaller rural health clinics and communities that were often outbid by
larger and more creditworthy buyers, causing those clinics and communities to struggle to secure supplies as well.86
Less access to critical medical supplies was likely one of many factors that led to disproportionately higher rates of COVID–19-related
illness and death among racial and ethnic minority groups during the
pandemic’s early stages. An April 2020 CDC report involving 580
COVID–19 patients found that 33% of hospitalized patients at that
time were Black/African American even though that group comprised
just 18% of the relevant population.87 The report likewise found much
higher virus-related death rates among Black/African American and
Hispanic/Latino groups.88 And a different report issued in April 2021
found that a majority of U.S. healthcare workers who died during the
first year of the pandemic “identified as people of color.”89 Comparatively poor access to the PPE needed to prevent disease transmission
likely contributed to these disparities—particularly in many
socioeconomically disadvantaged nursing homes across the country,
residents of which were predominantly members of racial or ethnic
minority groups.90
85. See Feiner, supra note 51 (noting that “[u]nder the current structure, states
with greater resources have an advantage in procuring medical supplies”).
86. See DePillis & Song, supra note 83 (noting that the nationwide “bidding wars”
for critical medical items are “raising concerns that facilities with shallow pockets, like
rural health clinics, won’t be able to obtain vital supplies”).
87. Shikha Garg et al., Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report: Hospitalization
Rates and Characteristics of Patients Hospitalized with Laboratory-Confirmed
Coronavirus Disease—COVID–NET, 14 States, March 1–30, 2020, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/
69/wr/mm6915e3.htm [https://perma.cc/6UAZ-6QEK].
88. Dana Sparks, Coronavirus Infection by Race: What’s Behind the Health Disparities?, MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 7, 2020), https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/discussion/coronavirus-infection-by-race-whats-behind-the-health-disparities/ [https://
perma.cc/9WJK-FNR9] (reporting that “the COVID-19 death rate among Black or
African American people was 92.3 deaths per 100,000 people and for Hispanic or
Latino people 74.3 per 100,000 people”).
89. Deaths in the Pandemic’s First Year, supra note 1.
90. Robert Gebeloff et al., The Striking Racial Divide in How Covid-19 Has Hit
Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-nursinghomes-racial-disparity.html (June 14, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2A3W-SSBG] (describing how staff “lacked adequate protective gear” in many nursing homes, including in a
predominantly Black facility in Baltimore County where “workers said they were
given rain ponchos and nylon hair bonnets in early April[] after Maryland required all
nursing homes to provide the staff with protective equipment” and reporting a similar
delay in the provision of face masks to staff at a California nursing home that had a
large population of Latino residents).
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5. Political Favoritism and Punishing of the Most Prepared States
Federal government officials’ apparent willingness to allow political
interests to influence their procurement and distribution of essential
medical supplies also drew heavy criticism during the COVID–19 outbreak. For example, several Democrat-controlled states reportedly received only a fraction of their requested medical items from the SNS
in early March 2020 while Florida—a key battleground state for
Trump’s re-election campaign—quickly received its full order of supplies.91 When federal officials took similar actions in Colorado, a
Democratic Congresswoman from that state characterized the Trump
Administration’s approach to allocating SNS supplies as “playing
politics with public health.”92
Accusations of political favoritism also arose after federal government officials awarded large new medical equipment supply contracts
to numerous questionable or inexperienced vendors, some of whom
had connections to the then-President.93 For instance, the Administration purportedly awarded several large contracts to a Tennessee company that had never contracted with the government but was led by a
major donor to Trump’s presidential campaign and to the Republican
National Committee.94 It also awarded a lucrative supply contract to a
company newly formed by Trump’s former Deputy Chief of Staff—
someone who had no prior history of securing government contracts

91. Toluse Olorunnipa et al., Governors Plead for Medical Equipment from Federal Stockpile Plagued by Shortages and Confusion, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2020, 2:39
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/governors-plead-for-medical-equipment-from-federal-stockpile-plagued-by-shortages-and-confusion/2020/03/31/
18aadda0-728d-11ea-87da-77a8136c1a6d_story.html [https://perma.cc/GN25-NDLG]
(quoting an anonymous official’s statement that “[t]he president knows Florida is so
important for his reelection,” so “[h]e pays close attention to what Florida wants”).
92. Press Release, Diana DeGette, Congresswoman, Rep. DeGette on President
Trump’s Ventilator Distribution Mismanagement (Apr. 8, 2020), https://
degette.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-degette-on-president-trump-s-ventilator-distribution-mismanagement [https://perma.cc/NNW3-M32P].
93. Weakened federal oversight of government contracting for medical supplies
during the pandemic has reportedly helped to enable abuses in this area. See generally
Josh Salman and Nick Penzenstadler, Hundreds of Millions of Dollars Goes to
COVID-19 Contractors Accused of Prior Fraud, USA TODAY, https://
www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2020/07/07/covid-19-contracts-overlook-fraud-claims-masks-sanitizer-and-ppe/5352886002/ (Jan. 26, 2021, 10:54 PM)
[https://perma.cc/KD5V-J2WV] (reporting that hundreds of millions of dollars in government contracts for medical supplies have recently gone to “vendors that have been
accused of defrauding taxpayers”).
94. Casey Tolan, Federal Agencies Turn to Untested Suppliers for Big PPE Contracts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/27/politics/coronavirus-federal-contractsppe-suppliers-problems-invs/index.html (May 27, 2020, 8:37 AM) [https://perma.cc/
98SJ-FQPJ] (noting AvMEDICAL CEO Troy Mizell’s donations to President Trump
and the Republican National Committee and subsequent securing of major medical
supply contracts).
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and who ultimately supplied hundreds of thousands of unusable face
masks.95
Meanwhile, the federal government’s approach to distributing SNS
supplies seemed to sometimes punish those state governments that
had stockpiled more emergency health supplies before the crisis. According to one FEMA official in April 2020, the agency was redirecting shipments of essential medical items away from certain areas
of the country based in part on “how much equipment a state already
has in storage.”96 At a moment when nearly every state faced major
shortages, this policy of providing more supplies to states that had prepared less surely sparked frustration among officials in more prepared
states. Questionable allocation strategies also emerged at the state
government level, with one state even contemplating the use of a lottery system to divvy out scarce medical items in the face of severe
shortages.97 Such arbitrary approaches to distributing critical emergency goods were not only arguably unfair; they also sent confusing
signals to state and local governments regarding the potential rewards
of building their own stockpiles.
B. Below-Market Compensation for Commandeered Supplies
The federal government and several state governments also responded to COVID–19-related medical supply shortages by issuing
orders authorizing themselves to commandeer privately owned goods.
In some cases, these “commandeering laws” directly or indirectly empowered governments to pay artificially low compensation when seizing private property.
1. Legally Prescribed Under-Compensation
Although some state commandeering laws in effect during the
COVID–19 pandemic required that compensation for seized goods be
based on the temporarily higher prices that then prevailed in the market, at least one state expressly authorized compensation based on
lower pre-pandemic prices. Executive orders issued in two adjacent
95. Jeffery Martin, Dem Reps Call for HHS Investigation of $3 Million Contract
That Provided Potentially Unusable Masks to Navajo Nation, NEWSWEEK (May 26,
2020, 10:37 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/dem-reps-call-hhs-investigation-3-million-contract-that-provided-potentially-unusable-masks-1506672 [https://perma.cc/
P7HT-AFBC].
96. Katharine Q. Seelye et al., Doctors and Governors Vie for Masks in Cloakand-Dagger Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/
us/coronavirus-states-masks.html [https://perma.cc/7JNM-DY9T].
97. Elizabeth Cohen, Arman Azad & Betsy Klein, California Tells Hospitals to
Consider Having a Lottery for Sought-After COVID-19 Drug, CNN, https://
www.cnn.com/2020/05/14/health/california-hospitals-covid-drug-lottery/index.html
(May 14, 2020, 7:02 PM) [https://perma.cc/FQB8-KR69] (describing the California
Department of Public Health’s lottery system, which it recommended in response to
shortages of Remdesivir, a drug believed to help treat some COVID–19 symptoms).
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northeastern states during the COVID–19 pandemic exemplify this
major difference in compensation approaches. New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo’s executive order on commandeering powers required compensation “at the rates prevailing in the market at the time
of acquisition.”98 In contrast, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf’s
April 2020 order authorizing the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (“PEMA”) to seize critical medical goods and distribute
them to those in greatest need included the following language regarding compensation:
The compensation price of PPE, pharmaceuticals, and other medical resources shall be the average price at which the same or similar
consumer goods or services were obtainable in the affected areas
during the last seven days immediately prior to March 6, 2020.99

For obvious reasons, the prevailing market prices for PPE and other
essential medical items in the week preceding March 6—the date on
which Governor Wolf announced Pennsylvania’s first confirmed
COVID–19 case and issued a disaster emergency declaration—were
surely far lower than those in early April when the state had accumulated more than 11,500 confirmed cases and was reporting several
hundred new cases per day.100 However, neither Governor Wolf nor
other Pennsylvania officials offered a clear justification for their prepandemic-level compensation approach.101
2. Indirect Under-Compensation Due to Price Controls
Commandeering laws applicable in certain other U.S. states and at
the federal government level during the COVID–19 pandemic did not
expressly prescribe how to calculate compensation for seized items
but did leverage other laws in ways that arguably also led to undercompensation.102 In particular, some states’ temporary price controls
98. N.Y. Exec. Ord. No. 202.14 (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/
no-20214-continuing-temporary-suspension-and-modification-laws-relating-disasteremergency [https://perma.cc/JQP6-4JAC].
99. Pa. Exec. Ord. No. 2020-408 (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/20200408-GOV-Critical-Medical-Resources-Order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5UC-MMV7].
100. See Greg Pickel, A Month of Coronavirus in Pa.: From 1 Case to 11,500. How
Long Until It Peaks?, PENN LIVE (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/
04/a-month-of-coronavirus-in-pa-from-1-case-to-11500-how-long-until-it-peaks.html
[https://perma.cc/AY3T-PKKF] (stating that Pennsylvania reported its first two
COVID–19 cases on March 6, 2020, and had more than 11,500 cases as of April 5 of
that year).
101. E.g., Pa. Exec. Ord. No. 2020-408, supra note 99.
102. New Jersey is an example of a state that authorized commandeering of medical supplies in response to the COVID–19 pandemic but did not specify how compensation for seized items would be calculated. See N.J. Exec. Ord. 113 (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20200408-GOV-CriticalMedical-Resources-Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5UL-XL6A] (authorizing New
Jersey’s Director of Emergency Management to “take or use personal services and/or
real or personal property, including medical resources, for the purpose of protecting
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on essential goods enabled state government agencies to commandeer
items at steep discounts.
California’s approach to compensating citizens for commandeered
medical supplies during COVID–19 exemplified this type of indirect
under-compensation structure. Governor Gavin Newsom’s April 2020
executive order prohibiting price gouging generally defined it as any
sale of an emergency item at a price that is 10% higher than the
seller’s February 2020 offer price.103 However, the executive order expressly exempted sales to state government entities from these antiprice-gouging restrictions, meaning that Californian citizens and businesses could still sell or forfeit goods to state or local government entities for compensation that exceeded pre-pandemic prices by well more
than 10%.104 Taken together, these two provisions created incentives
for holders of essential medical items in California to actively seek to
sell or turn over the items only to state or local government buyers
whose exemptions systematically allow them to offer artificially low
purchase prices and still outbid all private buyers.
Temporary price-gouging restrictions imposed at the federal level
during the COVID–19 pandemic similarly enabled federal agencies to
under-compensate citizens and businesses for commandeered goods.
Under the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,
President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency due to the pandemic in March 2020 temporarily empowered FEMA to begin commandeering medical items as needed to respond to the crisis.105 The
Trump Administration also imposed temporary federal price-gouging
restrictions during that same month, effectively creating temporary
price ceilings for some of the same goods FEMA was authorized to
commandeer.106
Although federal constitutional law is unclear regarding how courts
must calculate compensation for commandeered goods during crises,
one line of cases does arguably support California’s and FEMA’s approach of compensating at artificially low price-ceiling rates when
such controls are in place. The U.S. Supreme Court analyzed a similar
or promoting the public health, safety, or welfare” and adding that “[c]ompensation
shall be provided following the procedures established by the Disaster Control Act,
N.J.S.A. App. A:9-51”); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § A:9-51.7 (West 2021) (requiring
the New Jersey state government to compensate the holders of private property that
the state seizes in response to an emergency but not specifying how to determine the
amount of compensation due for such seizures beyond “just compensation”).
103. Cal. Exec. Ord. No. N-44-20 (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/4.3.20-EO-N-44-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/65N5-UXNZ].
104. See id.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 5196(i)(1) (authorizing FEMA’s Administrator to “procure by
condemnation or otherwise . . . materials and facilities for emergency preparedness,
with the right to take immediate possession thereof”). As discussed, federal officials
made clear during the early stages of the pandemic that they would aggressively prosecute hoarders and price gougers.
106. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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issue in U.S. v. Commodities Trading Corp., a 1950 case disputing the
amount of compensation due after the U.S. War Department requisitioned 760,000 pounds of black pepper from a private company during
World War II.107 Because of the war, the U.S. Office of Price Administration (“OPA”) had imposed dollars-per-pound price ceilings on a
long list of goods, including pepper.108 When the War Department
requisitioned the company’s pepper, the Department claimed it was
obligated to pay only the OPA’s artificially low ceiling price as just
compensation.109 The company disagreed, arguing it was entitled to a
much higher compensation rate based on the likely market value of
the pepper once the OPA price ceilings were removed.110 The Court
held for the War Department, finding that government entities
“should be able to buy goods fulfilling their wartime needs at the
prices fixed for other purchasers” and noting the “crucial importance
of this . . . to limit inflation and prevent profiteering.”111 The Court
majority went on to explain:
[S]hould judicial awards of just compensation be uniformly greater
in amount than ceiling prices, expectations of pecuniary gains from
condemnations might prompt many owners to withhold essential
materials until the Government requisitioned them. We think the
congressional purpose and the necessities of a wartime economy require that ceiling prices be accepted as the measure of just compensation, so far as that can be done consistently with the objectives of
the Fifth Amendment.112

Although the specific OPA price ceilings prescribed during World War
II are quite different from the mostly percentage-based-price-gouging
restrictions imposed during the COVID–19 pandemic, it is quite possible that compensation payments based on such restricted prices would
be upheld on similar rationales. Regardless of their constitutionality,
however, such artificially low payouts can contribute to undesirable
policy outcomes for reasons explored in more detail in Part IV
below.113
C. Calls for New Medical Stockpiling Policies
The severe medical supply shortages that hampered U.S. efforts to
respond to the COVID–19 pandemic generated an unprecedented
level of interest in reforming the nation’s approach to emergency
stockpiling. Among other things, these challenges prompted Congress
to dramatically increase its funding of the SNS. Provisions of the
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 122 (1950).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 122–23.
Id. at 124–25.
Id. at 125.
See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 177.
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Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, enacted in March 2020, authorized the HHS Secretary to expend up to
$16 billion on medical supplies for the SNS114—an amount roughly
twenty-five times greater than Congress’ annual appropriation to the
SNS in recent years.115
A handful of federal legislators also soon began promoting various
legislative reforms to U.S. stockpiling policies, most of which called
for major expansions of the federal government’s role in the national
stockpiling effort. One bill introduced in April 2020 sought to create
an entirely new agency—the “Emergency Office of Manufacturing for
Public Health”—within HHS.116 This new agency would have authority to acquire patents for emergency medical supplies from private
stakeholders and contract with private manufacturers to produce
those items or manufacture them on its own for eventual distribution
to federal, state, and local health systems.117 A second introduced bill
sought to go even further and designate the federal government as the
“sole buyer, vendor, owner and distributor of critical medical equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic and all future national health
emergencies.”118
As the COVID–19 pandemic wore on, continuing worldwide
shortages of medical supplies also increasingly prompted calls for new
U.S. policies to support the buildout of domestic supply chains for
critical emergency goods. Under the Defense Production Act, the
President of the United States already possesses powers to commandeer private industry assets for the manufacture of essential goods
during crises—a power President Trump exercised to some degree.119
However, there were still widespread PPE shortages in healthcare facilities across the country several months after the COVID–19 outbreak began, suggesting that these executive powers alone were not

114. CARES Act, Pub. L. 116-136, Div. B, Title VIII, 134 Stat. 281, 553–61 (2020).
115. See Reisinger, supra note 39 (noting that Congress had allocated $610 million
to the SNS in 2019 and $620 million in 2020).
116. See Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Warren, Schakowsky to Introduce Legislation to Publicly Manufacture Personal Protective Equipment, Prescription Drugs, Other Medical Supplies (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.warren.senate.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/warren-schakowsky-to-introduce-legislation-to-publiclymanufacture-personal-protective-equipment-prescription-drugs-other-medical-supplies [https://perma.cc/2BC5-24EJ].
117. S. 3847, 116th Cong. (2020).
118. Press Release, Anthony Brown, supra note 82 (describing introduction of the
proposed “Pandemic Response and Interstate Cost Equity Act of 2020” or “PRICE
Act” in May 2020).
119. Aishvarya Kavi, Virus Surge Brings Calls for Trump to Invoke Defense Production Act, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/us/
coronavirus-nursing-homes-racial-disparity.html [https://perma.cc/KH29-4M9B]
(“President Trump used the [Defense Production Act] to press General Motors to
begin production of ventilators.”).

R
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enough to safeguard the nation against long-term shortages.120 Sensing growing frustration over prolonged medical supply shortages,
then-Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden introduced a plan in
July 2020 focused on helping move supply chains for several types of
essential goods “back to U.S. soil.”121 A Senate bill introduced that
same month likewise sought to use investment tax credits to stimulate
domestic manufacturing projects for certain PPE.122 After his election,
President Biden continued his push for greater government investment in stockpiling resources, proposing to allocate nearly $1 billion
in new funding to the SNS.123
IV.

MODELING STOCKPILING INCENTIVES

The nation’s inadequate stockpiling of the supplies needed to respond to the COVID–19 pandemic is attributable in part to shortcomings in the policy regime that presently governs the U.S. stockpiling
effort. The country’s excessive reliance on federally owned medical
stockpiles unjustifiably increases the per-unit stockpiling costs of
many rotatable emergency items. These elevated costs, together with
certain externality problems and behavioral biases, have long resulted
in underinvestment in public and private stockpiling. Uncertainty
about the division of stockpiling duties among the SNS, state governments, and the private sector has likewise deterred efficient levels of
stockpiling. Price-gouging restrictions and certain types of commandeering policies have even further weakened incentives for private entities to stockpile. And the nation’s increasing reliance on
international supply chains to meet its demand for essential medical
120. See, e.g., Geoff Mulvihill & Camille Fassett, Protective Gear for Medical Workers Begins to Run Low Again, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/
481d933b0caa6f5fc61f466c86d4777b [https://perma.cc/QK6G-QLK2] (quoting National Nurses United president Deborah Burger as stating that “[w]e’re five months
into this and there are still shortages of gowns, hair covers, shoe covers, masks, [and]
N95 masks”); Naomi Martin, ‘It’s Like Pulling Teeth’: There’s Still a PPE Shortage—
and a Second Wave Could Send Medical Workers into Crisis Mode, BOS. GLOBE,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/06/21/nation/dangerous-shortages-protective-gearpersist-mass-hospitals-clinicians-say/ (June 21, 2020, 10:35 PM) [https://perma.cc/
UVR2-WS7L] (describing continued widespread shortages of PPE).
121. See Will Weissert, Biden Wants U.S. to Produce More of Its Own Pandemic
Supplies, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/642660dbc67fbb16260
a27f2f89418d8 [https://perma.cc/C5D5-P5H5]; see also The Biden Plan to Rebuild U.S.
Supply Chains and Ensure the U.S. Does Not Face Future Shortages of Critical Equipment, JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/supplychains/ [https://perma.cc/M8XQWUHG].
122. See Press Release, Lindsay Graham, Senator, Graham, Capito, Rounds Introduce Legislation to Move PPE Supply Chain from China to the United States (July
22, 2020), https://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=066446
6C-D1E6-4A4B-A3CA-DBEF3716DD5B [https://perma.cc/M7PB-QHEU].
123. Noah Weiland & Margot Sanger-Katz, The C.D.C. Would Get a Significant
Increase in Funding Under Biden’s Spending Plan., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/04/09/us/hhs-cdc-spending.html [https://perma.cc/7KVRWC92].
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goods has made it much more difficult for the nation to address longterm emergency shortages.
In this moment of unprecedented interest in reforming the nation’s
stockpiling policy structure, it is worthwhile to more methodically consider the distinct economic incentives at play in stockpiling decisions.
Like almost any activity, stockpiling involves specific costs and benefits, and rational, self-interested actors are likely to engage in it only
to the extent they believe the expected benefits of doing so exceed the
costs.124 On similar reasoning, all else equal, the U.S. stockpiling system will become more cost-efficient and better able to affordably safeguard the country as it reduces per-unit stockpiling costs or increases
per-unit stockpiling benefits for emergency items. The following simplified, two-state cost-benefit model for stockpiling decisions is a useful framework for identifying and examining potential means of
improving the nation’s stockpiling policy structure. Although this Article uses the hypothetical example of a hospital administrator stockpiling respirator masks to illustrate the workings of the model, the
core principles illustrated through the example are equally applicable
to private and public stockpilers of a wide range of emergency items.
Suppose hypothetically that during a period when there is no active
public health emergency, an administrator at a private for-profit hospital is seeking to determine the optimal number of N95 respirator
masks to store in the hospital’s emergency stockpile. The hospital’s
objective is to build a private stockpile just large enough to cover all
of the hospital’s mask needs in the unlikely event of a major disaster
requiring unusually high quantities of masks. Assume further that the
hospital is profit-maximizing and has perfect information regarding all
relevant costs and risk probabilities associated with this stockpiling
decision. And assume, for simplicity, that masks cannot appreciate in
value while stockpiled but may temporarily take on heightened value
when they are needed as part of a major crisis response.

124. Concededly, the specific costs and benefits to a stockpiler of stockpiling a
given item for a given period are likely to vary greatly depending on the total quantity
stockpiled, so it would be more precise to state that a rational stockpiler will continue
growing its stockpile so long as its marginal benefit of doing so exceeds its marginal
cost. The private marginal cost of stockpiling a particular type of item for a year is the
incremental change in total stockpiling costs borne by a stockpiler from storing one
additional unit of the item for that period. The private marginal benefit of stockpiling
the item is the incremental change in total expected benefits accruing to the stockpiler
from storing one additional unit of the item for one year. For simplicity, this Article
intentionally employs a basic cost-benefit model rather than a more rigorous marginal
cost-benefit analysis approach. The general observations that are the main takeaways
from this simplified framework would nonetheless hold true under a more complex
marginal cost-benefit analysis.
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A. The Costs of Stockpiling
The total cost (C) of stockpiling an N95 respirator mask or any
other given item is the sum of three primary categories of costs: warehousing costs (cw), opportunity costs (co), and depreciation costs (cd).
For any given item, let:
C = the total cost of stockpiling one unit of the item for one calendar year;
cw = the direct costs of physically storing the item for one year;
co = the highest risk-free annual return the stockpiler foregoes by
stockpiling the item for one year rather than investing its value;
and
cd = the actual decrease in the stockpiled item’s market value after one year of storage, estimated as the non-emergency value
(M) of the stockpiled item divided by the number of years (N) of
the item’s shelf life.
Under these assumptions, expressed mathematically:
C = c w + co + cd

Equation (1)

All three of the specific types of stockpiling-related costs delineated in
Equation (1) are influenced by various factors, including some stockpiling policies. Policy changes that reduce or offset any one of these
costs can thus potentially improve the efficiency of the nation’s stockpiling system. The following are descriptions of each of these three
types of costs and of some of the main factors affecting them.
1. Warehousing Costs
Warehousing costs (cw), defined in this model as the direct costs of
physically storing a given item for one year, are relatively difficult to
manipulate through stockpiling policies. Warehousing costs tend to be
based primarily on the rental value of the lowest-cost space where an
item may be properly stored and kept acceptably available for emergency use. Any expenditures required to physically safeguard, manage, and maintain stored goods also constitute warehousing costs.125
Calculating warehousing costs is generally straightforward. Suppose, for example, that the annual fair market rent is $5,000 for the
lowest-cost adequate storage space available to the hypothetical hospital described above and that this space has capacity to store 100,000
respirator masks. Dividing the first of these figures by the second figure reveals that under these assumptions, the hospital’s annual perunit warehousing cost for masks is:
125. The contracted ventilator maintenance mentioned above is one example of
such a maintenance-related warehousing cost. See Sanger et al., supra discussion 72
accompanying note 72.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL102.txt

78

unknown

Seq: 30

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

15-NOV-21

13:18

[Vol. 9

$5,000 ÷ 100,000 = $0.05.
Some commonly stockpiled items have characteristics that justifiably involve higher per-unit warehousing costs for reasons that are
wholly exogenous to the general stockpiling policy structure. National
security concerns associated with some stockpiled supplies, such as
nuclear materials, military weapons, or anti-viral drugs, justify higher
per-unit expenditures to safely guard the nation’s stockpiles of these
items. All else equal, per-unit warehousing costs also tend to be higher
for larger items. And whether particular types of items require a climate-controlled storage space, enhanced security, or periodic maintenance can likewise affect warehousing costs in ways that are largely
independent of the policies surrounding them.
On the other hand, certain factors affecting per-unit warehousing
costs may be influenced by stockpiling policies. In particular, economies of scale can often decrease per-unit warehousing costs as the total quantity stored increases—a relationship that weighs in favor of
stockpiling policies that advantage large, centralized stockpiles over
smaller, distributed ones.126
2. Opportunity Costs
The opportunity costs (co) of stockpiling, which exist because stockpiling an item precludes a stockpiler from investing the item’s value
elsewhere and earning a positive return, are also difficult to alter
through stockpiling policy. The opportunity cost of stockpiling any
given item can be calculated by multiplying the item’s monetary value
by the highest risk-free return the stockpiler could have earned by
instead investing that value over the stockpiling period. For example,
if respirator masks cost $1 each and our hypothetical hospital’s riskfree real return on investable assets is 4% per annum,127 the hospital’s
opportunity cost (co) of stockpiling one mask for one year is:
126. As other researchers have observed, policies that favor more centralized
stockpiling models, with a smaller number of total warehouses and more items stored
at each, might help to lower aggregate warehousing costs by harnessing these scaling
effects. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 140 (13th ed. 2015) (applying basic geometry principles to warehouse buildings to show that “the very nature of warehousing creates technological
relationships that lead to economies of scale”). Potential economies of scale in warehousing are one of many factors typically considered in private supply-chain design.
See, e.g., Kerstin Baumgartner, André Fuetterer & Ulrich W. Thonemann, Supply
Chain Design Considering Economies of Scale and Transport Frequencies, 218 EUR. J.
OPERATIONAL RSCH. 789, 789 (2012) (outlining a “multi-product supply chain design
model” that accounts for economies of scale in warehousing).
127. The 4% figure used in this hypothetical example is arbitrary and used strictly
for illustrative purposes. One relatively recent study suggests that hospitals have average returns on investable assets of about 4.6% per year but that those returns fluctuate widely from year to year. See Kelly Gooch, Healthcare Organizations Report
Highest Investment Return Since 2013, BECKER’S HOSP. CFO REP. (Sept. 13, 2018),
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$1.00 x 0.04 = $0.04.
Like warehousing costs, opportunity costs are based on factors that
are not heavily influenced by stockpiling policies. Average returns on
investable assets—the primary factor affecting the opportunity costs
of stockpiling—do vary somewhat among stockpilers, but these modest variations largely depend on factors that are beyond the reach of
stockpiling programs and laws.128 Accordingly, the analysis and policy
recommendations in this Article largely ignore these costs.
3. Depreciation Costs
Depreciation costs (cd) are the most malleable category of stockpiling costs and thus warrant particular attention when structuring stockpiling policies. The depreciation cost of stockpiling an item for one
year is the decrease in the item’s actual market value that is attributable to its storage and non-use over that period. Although the true depreciation costs of stockpiling vary by item and are rarely linear across
time, it is sufficient for the illustrative purposes of this model to apply
a simple straight-line depreciation approach to evenly distribute these
costs over an item’s shelf life.129 This is done by dividing the market
value (V0) of the stockpiled item at the time of acquisition by the
number of years (N) of the item’s total shelf life based on manufacturer specifications or applicable regulations.130 To illustrate, suppose
the market value of a given respirator mask when a stockpiler initially
purchases it (V0) is $1 and that the mask has a shelf life of five years
(N), after which its value drops to $0. Based on these assumptions, the
annual straight-line depreciation cost (cd) associated with storing this
item would be:
cd = (V0/N) = $1.00/5 years = $0.20.

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/healthcare-organizations-report-highest-investment-return-since-2013.html [https://perma.cc/6RBQ-8T76].
128. For instance, many government entities are comparatively low-credit-risk borrowers with access to tax-favored government financing options and thus may incur
slightly lower opportunity costs from stockpiling than major private corporations.
129. The straight-line depreciation method under Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (“GAAP”), which is employed here solely for its simplicity, is the most
ubiquitous and basic accounting depreciation method. Keela Helstrom, GAAP Depreciation Methods, HOUS. CHRON., https://smallbusiness.chron.com/gaap-depreciation-methods-55425.html#:~:text=straight%20Line%20Method,by
%20its%20estimated%20useful%20life [https://perma.cc/TA64-8CFH] (outlining the
straight-line depreciation method and describing it as “the most common GAAP
method used to depreciate a company’s assets”).
130. See id.
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4. Total Per-Unit Stockpiling Cost
Using Equation (1) and the hypothetical cost measures used above,
it is now possible to calculate this fictional hospital’s total annual cost
of stockpiling one N95 respirator mask. Specifically:
C = (cw + co + cd) = ($0.05 + $0.04 + $0.20) = $0.29.
As this calculation suggests, much of the total per-unit cost of stockpiling an item is often attributable to depreciation costs. Fortunately,
as will be shown below, rotating stockpiled supplies and using or selling them before they lose value can offset these costs, thereby increasing the net benefits of stockpiling activities.131
B. Factors Affecting the Expected Benefits of Stockpiling
The specific benefits of stockpiling an item are often more difficult
to characterize and measure than stockpiling costs. For some types of
goods, the benefits resemble those of an insurance policy: Stockpiling
these goods is primarily a way to guard against the low-probability
risk of major loss resulting from not having the item during an emergency. This “insurance policy” depiction of stockpiling benefits seems
fitting for highly specialized pharmaceutical items such as epinephrine
auto-injector pens in a school classroom where some students have
severe peanut allergies.132 The benefits of stockpiling anti-viral drugs,
anti-radiation drugs, and special military weapons also seem consistent with this “insurance policy” conception of stockpiling. Such items
truly save the day if a relevant emergency occurs; but if not, they go
unused and eventually expire, and the stockpiler is simply grateful to
have never actually needed them.
For many other types of goods, however, the benefits of stockpiling
more closely resemble those of an investment that offers a lowprobability prospect of generating a large return. This “investment”
view of stockpiling benefits arguably better describes the advantages
of storing many nonpharmaceutical or everyday items such as surgical
gloves, food grains, crude oil, or pallets of bottled water. Stockpilers
can easily sell off these types of items or put them to productive use in
the ordinary course of their activities if no relevant emergency occurs—an important source of alternative value that seldom accompanies most insurance policies.133 Moreover, even during emergencies it
131. See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.
132. For basic information on epinephrine pens and potential legal obligations for
some schools and day care centers to keep them on hand, see generally Marie Plicka,
Mr. Peanut Goes to Court: Accommodating an Individual’s Peanut Allergy in Schools
and Day Care Centers Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 14 J.L. & HEALTH
87 (1999).
133. Most familiar types of retail insurance policies—such as fire insurance and car
insurance—lack this type of alternative value although it should be noted that there
are a few exceptions. For example, many types of life insurance policies give policy-

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL102.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 33

15-NOV-21

A MORE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE

13:18

81

is often possible, with some extra cash and effort, to acquire these
types of items from others and thereby avoid major losses from their
absence—another attribute that makes stockpiling them more like a
speculative investment than an insurance policy. Because this Article
focuses primarily on stockpiling policy reforms involving this second
category of more generic goods, the cost-benefit model that follows
adopts this latter characterization and generally frames stockpiling as
an investment.
The expected benefits of stockpiling a given item are largely a function of (1) the probability of an emergency requiring use of the item,
(2) the item’s temporarily increased value in the context of that emergency, (3) the proportion of the stockpile that is consistently rotated
and used or sold, and (4) any additional psychological or other benefits attributable solely to the stockpiler’s subjective risk preferences.
Accordingly, for any given item, let:
B = the total expected benefit of stockpiling the item for one calendar year;
p = the probability that an emergency requiring use of the stockpiled item will occur during the next year;134
Ve = the stockpiled item’s temporarily elevated value to its owner
in the context of a relevant emergency;135 and
A = any additional value the stockpiler gains from storing the
item that is directly attributable to the stockpiler’s subjective risk
preferences.
Applying these definitions—and assuming for now that the stockpiler
never rotates or uses any stockpiled items unless there is a major
emergency—the expected annual benefit (B) of stockpiling one unit
of a given item is as follows:
B = p (Ve) + (1-p)(0) + A

Equation (2)

holders an option to surrender their policy in exchange for a cash payout while still
alive and some secondary markets for such insurance policy interests have even
emerged in recent years. For a discussion of legal issues surrounding those markets,
see generally Peter Nash Swisher, Wagering on the Lives of Strangers: The Insurable
Interest Requirement in the Life Insurance Secondary Market, 50 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 703, 703 (2015).
134. It follows from the provided definition of p that (1-p) represents the
probability that no emergency requiring use of the stockpiled item will occur during
the next year.
135. A single item such as an N95 respirator mask could obviously prove useful in
various types of emergencies, each of which has a different probability of occurring.
Similarly, the anticipated elevated value of a given item in the context of a disaster
likely varies a lot depending on the type of disaster (e.g., a mask may have an elevated
value of $1.50 in a severe influenza season or an elevated value of $10 in the context
of a major biochemical attack). For simplicity, this model uses only variables p and X
to represent the weighted sums of these probabilities and temporarily heightened
values.
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Equation (2) expresses the fact that as the likelihood (p) of an
emergency requiring the use of the stockpiled item grows, the expected benefit (B) of stockpiling proportionally increases. B likewise
increases proportionally as the item’s anticipated mid-emergency
value (Ve) grows. And B increases as the stockpiler’s risk preferences
shift such that the stockpiler derives more of this additional type of
value (A) from stockpiling the item.136 The stockpiler’s inventory rotation practices—the other important factor affecting B—were referenced only in the assumptions for Equation (2) but will be fully
integrated into the expected benefits formula below. The following
materials use examples involving the hypothetical hospital described
above to demonstrate how each of the four factors just outlined can
affect the expected benefits of stockpiling an item.
1. The Stockpiler’s Rotation Practices
The expected benefits of stockpiling depend heavily on the degree
to which the stockpiler rotates and sells or uses its stockpiled goods
before their value diminishes. A numeric example helps to illustrate
this relationship. Suppose there is a 5% chance (p) that a catastrophic
event will occur during the coming year necessitating our hypothetical
hospital’s use of a stockpiled $1 respirator mask and that the temporarily heightened value of the mask (Ve) during such a crisis would be
$5. There is a far greater likelihood—expressed as (1-p) in Equation
(2) and equal to 95% in this example—that no emergency will occur
and the hospital will thus not use the mask during that period.
Assuming again, for now, that the hospital does not rotate and sell
or use any of its stockpiled masks before they expire, the only actual
value the hospital gains from stockpiling the mask in a non-emergency
year is any non-pecuniary benefit (A) resulting from the hospital’s risk
preferences.137 Applying Equation (2) from above, if the hospital’s
subjective risk preferences make it willing to annually pay $0.01 per
mask (A) to have the mask on hand, then the hospital’s expected benefit (B) of stockpiling one mask for one year would be:
B = (0.05)($5.00) + (0.95)($0.00) + $0.01 = $0.26.
Because this $0.26 benefit (B) is less than the hypothetical hospital’s
$0.29 cost (C) of stockpiling a mask calculated above, the hospital
would expect to incur a net loss of $0.03 by stockpiling the mask for
that year and would thus elect not to stockpile it under these
assumptions.
Fortunately, the benefits of rotating stockpiled inventories of an
item can offset some or all of the depreciation costs associated with
136. For the full discussion of this additional benefit, see generally discussion infra
Section IV.B.4.
137. See generally infra Section IV.B.4.
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stockpiling it, thereby increasing the net benefits of stockpiling and
promoting more voluntary stockpiling activities. However, not all
commonly stockpiled goods are easy to rotate, and many are hardly
rotatable at all. Because rotatability varies so much from item to item
and can greatly impact net stockpiling benefits, it is critically important to account for these differences when structuring stockpiling
policies.138
The rotatability of a stockpile of any good is primarily a function of
three measures: (1) the quantity of the item the stockpiler believes it
could need for a relevant crisis (its “stockpile requirement”), (2) the
quantity of the item the stockpiler can annually use up or sell off and
replace during non-crisis periods (its “annual demand”), and (3) the
number of years of the item’s shelf life (its “shelf life”). Using these
three measures for any given good, it is possible to calculate a
stockpiler’s “rotatability factor” (R)—a standardized measure that
can be used to compare rotatability among various stockpile items.
Specifically, for any item:

To illustrate: Suppose that our hypothetical hospital anticipates it
could need up to 100,000 respirator masks if a relevant crisis were to
arise. Assume further that the hospital annually uses 5,000 masks
when there is no crisis, that the hospital cannot sell masks to others,
and that the masks each have a shelf life of five years. Based on these
figures, the hospital’s rotatability factor (R) for respirator masks is as
follows:

A 0.25 rotatability factor (R) indicates that the hospital is capable of
rotating up to 25% of its stockpile requirement of the item. As R increases, the proportion of the stockpile that is rotatable also rises.
Incorporating this rotatability factor (R) into Equation (2) is the
final step to fully constructing a basic stockpiling cost-benefit model.
Assuming again that respirator masks have a five-year shelf life (N),
perfectly rotating the masks would require that the hospital use or sell
at least one-fifth of its stockpiled mask inventory per year and fully
138. Some CDC-funded educational materials on the SNS suggest that the agency
does at least consider a good’s “rotation capability for going back into the commercial
market” when deciding which goods to add to the national stockpile. Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing Strategic National
Stockpile Assets: A Guide for Preparedness, Version 11, CDC 14, https://
www.orau.gov/sns/v11/ReceivingDistributingDispensingSNSAssets_V11.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N25W-WHBJ].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL102.txt

84

unknown

Seq: 36

15-NOV-21

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

13:18

[Vol. 9

recoup the original $1 purchase price (V0) for every rotated mask. Expressed mathematically, such perfect rotating practices would generate an annual “rotation benefit” equal to (V0/N) per mask in non-crisis
years. However, the hospital’s rotatability factor (R) of 0.25 for masks
denotes that the hospital cannot perfectly rotate them. Multiplying the
hospital’s per-mask rotation benefit by R in the expected benefits
formula accounts for this fact by counting rotation benefits only for
that proportion of the mask stockpile that the hospital can actually
rotate during non-crisis periods. Specifically, the formula becomes:
B = (p)(Ve) + (1-p)(V0/N)(R) + A

Equation (3)

Plugging the hypothetical figures from above into this new Equation
(3):
B = (0.05)($5.00) + (0.95)($0.20)(0.25) + $0.01 = $0.3075
Because this new expected benefit measure of roughly $0.31 exceeds
the stockpiler’s $0.29 cost (C) from above, stockpiling the mask becomes cost-justified under these new assumptions so long as the hospital consistently rotates as many masks as it is capable of rotating.
Goods that have the highest rotatability factors tend to be consumable items that the stockpiler routinely uses up or sells in large quantities even when there is no relevant crisis. Importantly, many of the
most disruptive medical supply shortages in the United States during
the COVID–19 pandemic have involved relatively rotatable non-pharmaceutical goods, including surgical masks, disposable gloves, shoe
covers, and hair covers.139 Food grains, crude oil, and critical minerals
are other examples of highly rotatable goods that have historically
been included in some emergency stockpiles.
Certain other types of commonly stockpiled items have relatively
low rotatability factors. Many durable goods, such as the medical ventilators that were in short supply during the COVID–19 pandemic, are
comparatively less rotatable because they are designed for repeated
use and are thus replaced less frequently. Some other types of commonly stockpiled goods, such as many antiviral or anti-radiation
drugs, have very low rotatability factors because they are seldom used
outside the context of a major crisis.140
139. See Mulvihill & Fassett, supra note 120.
140. Interestingly, there are legal constraints on the rotation of some stockpiled
SNS antivirals for use during seasonal influenza outbreaks or for other more predictable uses—constraints that have drawn criticism from some researchers. E.g., INST. OF
MED., ANTIVIRALS FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: GUIDANCE ON DEVELOPING A DISTRIBUTION AND DISPENSING PROGRAM 33 (2008) (arguing that the “fact that rotating
stocks is not allowed” for many SNS antivirals “precludes the possibility of considering alternatives that could have economic and preparedness benefits” and constrains
the SNS “in ways that are counterproductive to effective preparedness”).
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Between these two ends of the rotatability spectrum are emergency
supplies that might be described as somewhat rotatable. N95 respirator masks, face shields, surgical isolation gowns, and nasopharyngeal
swabs probably fall into this category because hospitals do use these
items in non-crisis periods but need far more of them when responding to certain types of public health emergencies. For instance, according to one report, the nation collectively uses only about 25 million
respirator masks annually during non-crisis periods,141 meaning that if
these masks have five-year shelf lives, the largest number the nation
could routinely rotate is about 125 million. In contrast, a 2015 CDCsponsored study estimated that the country could need upwards of 3.5
billion such masks to respond to a severe, year-long pandemic.142
Based on these figures, the nation’s rotatability factor (R) for these
masks is roughly:

This relatively low rotatability factor means that even the most wellexecuted rotation practices could offset only about 3.6% of the depreciation costs associated with adequately stockpiling these masks. For
items like these with low rotatability factors, fully rotatable stockpiles
alone are incapable of adequately equipping the country to respond to
disasters so supplemental policy strategies are needed to make up the
difference.143
If a stockpiler can perfectly rotate its stockpiled inventory of an
item, its rotatability factor (R) for that item equals the factor’s maximum value of 1.00.144 When R equals 1.00, it is particularly easy to
demonstrate how rotating stockpile inventories offsets depreciation
costs and increases net stockpiling benefits. Substituting (V0/N) for
(cd) in Equation (1) and pairing that equation with Equation (3)
reveals that if a stockpiler is perfectly rotating its stockpile of a given
item, the expected benefits (B) of stockpiling will exceed the costs (C)
and thus warrant stockpiling whenever:
Cw + Co + (V0/N) < p (Ve) + (1-p)(V0/N)(1.00) + A
141. Dickinson, supra note 74 (reporting that “N95 mask usage is relatively uncommon; a typical hospital might only use 6,000 N95 masks over a full year, with national
demand reaching about 25 million masks a year”).
142. Id.
143. In particular, it is often necessary to maintain robust domestic supply chains
and dispatchable production capacity for difficult-to-rotate emergency stockpile
items. For a discussion of policy strategies for pursuing that objective, see generally
infra notes 209–20 and accompanying text.
144. Because it is not possible for stockpilers to gain more than 100% of possible
rotation benefits, rotatability factors exceeding 1.00 must be capped at that value
when inserted into Equation (3).
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Subtracting (1-p)(V0/N) from both sides of this inequality then simplifies it to:
Cw + Co + p(V0/N) < p (Ve) + A.

Equation (4)

Such simplification is possible because rotating 100% of a stockpile
fully offsets the depreciation costs associated with stockpiling in all
years when there is no emergency requiring use of the stockpiled item.
Inserting the hypothetical valuations from above into this simplified
expression in Equation (4) highlights just how much perfectly rotating
goods can increase the net benefits of stockpiling:
$0.05 + $0.04 + (0.05)($0.20) < (0.05)($5.00) + 0.01
$0.10 < $0.26.
As these calculations show, adding the assumption that the hospital
perfectly rotated its stockpile of masks increased the hospital’s perunit net expected benefit (B - C) of stockpiling the masks from -$0.03
to $0.16.145 As will be shown in Part V below, policies that encourage
and facilitate the rotation of a greater proportion of the country’s
stockpiled goods could similarly do much to increase the efficiency
and effectiveness of the nation’s stockpiling system.146
2. The Stockpiled Item’s Anticipated Emergency Value
The heightened value (Ve) a stockpiler expects a given stockpile
item to temporarily have during a crisis can also greatly impact the
expected benefits of stockpiling, and certain policy strategies can likewise have profound effects on this variable. For example, as highlighted above, although respirator masks were widely available for
about $1 each (V0) before the COVID–19 outbreak, there were reports of sales at roughly $8 apiece (Ve) during the pandemic.147 A core
benefit of stockpiling any item is the potential to use or sell the item in
an emergency while it holds such elevated value. Accordingly, laws
that restrict stockpilers’ ability to capture that additional value can
reduce Ve and thereby weaken incentives to stockpile.148
3. The Probability of a Crisis Requiring the Stockpiled Item
The probability (p) that an emergency will occur that temporarily
increases the value of an item can also affect the expected benefit of
145. This reference to a -$0.03 net benefit refers to the difference between per-unit
stockpiling costs ($0.29) and benefits ($0.26) calculated in Section IV.B.1 above when
it was assumed that the hospital rotated none of its mask stockpile.
146. See discussion infra Section V.A.1.
147. Feiner, supra note 52; see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
148. Some examples of such laws are examined in depth in Part IV below. See discussion infra Section IV.C.2.
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stockpiling it, and presently such probabilities are relatively high for
several types of commonly stockpiled goods. As of May 2021, the
COVID–19 pandemic continued to strain the U.S. health care system,
and the country faced discouragingly high virus infection rates despite
the deployment of effective vaccines.149 Moreover, even long before
COVID–19 reached American soil, experts had been warning of
growing pandemic risks in the United States because of climate
change and increased urbanization.150 Heightened geopolitical risks
involving the United States and its allies have likewise strengthened
the likelihood of military conflicts, terrorist attacks, or other humancaused public emergencies in recent years.151 These and other factors
suggest that the probabilities (p) associated with many types of stockpiled emergency goods are presently at relatively high levels and are
likely to remain elevated for the foreseeable future.
It also bears mentioning that heuristic biases can distort perceptions
of p in ways that ultimately affect stockpiling policy. Behavioral economists have long emphasized that individuals are often excessively optimistic and irrationally under-protect themselves from lowprobability risks.152 Humans likewise often exhibit myopic behavior,
excessively focusing on near-term costs and benefits and over-discounting future ones.153 These observable behavioral tendencies
might excessively weaken political support for government-funded
stockpiling initiatives during periods when there has not recently been
a major crisis requiring stockpiled supplies and no such crisis seems to
be looming on the horizon. In the words of one researcher, “You’re
basically investing in events that are ultimately unlikely to ever oc-

149. Jeff Wise, The Pandemic’s Lethal Twilight, INTELLIGENCER (May 3, 2021),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/05/when-will-the-covid-19-pandemic-end.html
[https://perma.cc/KJ98-MMVR].
150. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Meyer, Confronting the Pandemic Superthreat of Climate
Change and Urbanization, 63 ORBIS 565, 571 (2019) (arguing that a combination of
climate change and increased global urbanization as creating a growing “pandemic
superthreat” in the United States).
151. Although it is difficult to quantify the magnitude of the nation’s heightened
geopolitical threats, well-regarded measures of such risks suggest that they are elevated. For instance, as of June 2020, the Blackrock Geopolitical Risk Index had been
more than two standard deviations above the five-year average for nearly two years.
See Geopolitical Risk Blackboard, BLACKROCK (May 2021), https://
www.blackrock.com/corporate/insights/blackrock-investment-institute/interactivecharts/geopolitical-risk-dashboard [https://perma.cc/2LP9-U4UD].
152. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal
Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659–60 (1998) (describing excessive optimism).
153. See William Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights: Patents and
Productive Inefficiency, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2045, 2061 (2015) (noting that “[e]mpirical
studies indicate . . . that individuals discount future events at a much higher rate and
value present costs and benefits substantially more than those in the future”) (citing
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1395–99 (2004)).
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cur . . . . [I]t’s very hard to convince people . . . on a continuous basis
[to] fund x, y[,] and z activities just in case it happens.”154
On the other hand, some of the same heuristic biases just described
can also strengthen political support for stockpiling programs in the
immediate aftermath of major crises by temporarily causing voters
and elected officials to place greater priority on stockpiling-related issues.155 When a recent and costly emergency shortage is fresh in citizens’ minds, myopic tendencies may temporarily make them more
willing to support new stockpiling policies to better safeguard against
such pain in the future. This effect was visible after the initial
COVID–19 outbreak as states and localities across the country invested unprecedented amounts to stockpile emergency supplies.156 A
small silver lining in the COVID–19 pandemic is that it has presently
created such a window of opportunity for advancing stockpiling policy
in the United States.
4. The Stockpiler’s Risk Preferences
The final variable in Equation (2), labeled as A, represents any additional benefits accruing to stockpilers that are attributable solely to
stockpilers’ subjective risk preferences. Although A can be difficult to
measure, it theoretically equals any amount a stockpiler would be willing to pay to stockpile an item that exceeds the objective probabilitybased expected value of stockpiling it.
Regardless of whether they view stockpiling as protection against a
risk or as a speculative investment, many stockpilers derive additional
benefits from stockpiling that would be unaccounted for in a purely
objective expected-benefits formula. The behavioral economics field
154. See Feiner, supra note 51 (quoting Mahshid Abir, a University of Michigan
emergency physician and senior policy researcher at the Rand Corporation).
155. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (describing how
the “availability heuristic,” by which “the frequency of some event is estimated by
judging how easy it is to recall other instances of this type,” can cause individuals to
“conclude, for example, that the probability of an event (such as a car accident) is
greater if they have recently witnessed an occurrence of that event than if they have
not”) (citing AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982)).
156. See, e.g., Evan Symon, Senator Who Killed 2011 PPE Stockpile, Authors New
90-Day PPE Requirement, CAL. GLOBE (June 21, 2020, 8:07 AM), https://
californiaglobe.com/section-2/senator-who-killed-2011-ppe-stockpile-authors-new-90day-ppe-requirement-bill/ [https://perma.cc/E7LE-WQXT] (describing new support in
California legislature for greatly expanding the state’s stockpiling program); Peter
Krouse, Cuyahoga County Council Committee Approves No-Bid Deal for Storage
Area to Stockpile PPE, CLEVELAND.COM, https://www.cleveland.com/news/2020/07/
cuyahoga-county-council-committee-approves-no-bid-deal-for-storage-area-to-stockpile-ppe.html (July 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/QE66-5KJR] (reporting a city council’s
plans for an unprecedented public investment to acquire a local stockpiling facility
site).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL102.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 41

15-NOV-21

A MORE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE

13:18

89

known as “prospect theory” submits that individuals tend to exhibit
risk-averse behavior in choices involving a low-probability risk of a
major loss and risk-seeking behavior in choices involving a lowprobability chance at a major windfall.157 Prospect theory helps to explain, among other things, why individuals routinely purchase insurance policies at prices that exceed actuarial rates and buy tickets for
lotteries or raffles that have low payout ratios.158 Equations (2) and
(3) above include the variable A to acknowledge this additional type
of stockpiling-related benefit, but otherwise this Article largely ignores A because it is difficult to significantly shift such risk preferences through stockpiling policies.
C. Applying the Cost-Benefit Model to Critique Existing Stockpiling
Policies
The stockpiling cost-benefit model just outlined provides a useful
framework for evaluating the nation’s existing stockpiling policy structure. As the nation learned during the COVID–19 pandemic, stockpiling policies can greatly impact public health and safety during a major
crisis, and the existing U.S. stockpiling policy regime has significant
room for improvement. The following materials use insights from the
cost-benefit model from above to highlight four distinct shortcomings
in the U.S. stockpiling policy structure.
1. Over-Centralized Stockpiling of Rotatable Supplies
One major deficiency of the nation’s current stockpiling system is its
excessive reliance on a single federal government agency to own and
store most of the nation’s stockpile of rotatable emergency items. As
shown mathematically above, regularly rotating and using or selling
stockpiled items before their value declines is a key way to limit perunit stockpiling costs for highly rotatable goods.159 Storing some fraction of a nation’s stockpile requirement of rotatable supplies in massive federally owned facilities may be justifiable for national security
purposes, but otherwise high-volume private sellers and users of these
157. Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1115, 1118 (2003) (noting that “[i]ndividuals tend to make risk-seeking choices
when selecting between options that appear to be low-probability gains and riskaverse choices when selecting between options that appear to be low-probability
losses” and that “this empirical finding conflicts with rational choice theory, which
generally assumes either risk neutrality or risk aversion in the face of both gains and
losses (whether low-probability or not)”). Prospect theory was first introduced by
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in a landmark article in 1979.
See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
158. HENRY N. BUTLER, CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & JOANNA SHEPHERD, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 298 (3d ed. 2014) (describing prospect theory as
holding that “most people are risk seeking with gains (they play the lottery) and risk
averse with losses (they buy insurance)”).
159. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1.
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items are arguably better situated to stockpile and rotate them. Even
when the SNS uses “vendor-managed inventory” contracts to enlist
private companies to help stockpile its goods, the SNS generally retains ownership of the goods, so incentives to rotate are weaker than
they could be if the goods were privately owned.160 Ironically, recent
directives issued in China suggest that even the communist Chinese
government seems to increasingly recognize the untapped potential of
involving private citizens and businesses in nationwide stockpiling
efforts.161
Although custodians of the SNS purport to regularly rotate and
maintain all of its stockpiled goods,162 numerous reports of expired or
otherwise unusable shipments of SNS medical supplies during the
COVID–19 pandemic cast serious doubt on those claims.163 In fairness, the U.S. government is not unique in struggling to rotate its centralized national medical stockpile: Accounts of large quantities of
expired or unusable goods in the medical stockpiles of other developed Western Nations such as Canada and the United Kingdom also
surfaced during the COVID–19 pandemic.164 The enormousness of
the SNS and the fact that the agency itself does not routinely use large
160. See supra discussion accompanying notes 41–42.
161. See Alexandra Sternlicht, China Tells Citizens to Stockpile Masks for
Preparedness, FORBES (May 28, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrasternlicht/2020/05/28/china-tells-citizens-to-stockpile-masks-for-preparedness/
#b80df4216009 [https://perma.cc/T7M4-89NZ] (noting that the Chinese government’s
recent announcements calling for citizens and businesses to build their own stockpiles
are “a sharp contrast to countries including the United States that have warned citizens not to stockpile masks” and noting that the Chinese government is “building a
three-prong emergency resource reserve plan, reliant on business, family[,] and governmental stockpiles”).
162. Often, stockpiled goods have already expired when the SNS rotates them out,
and they thus have little value. See, e.g., Reisinger, supra note 39 (“The goal is to have
acquisitions in place to fill-behind expiring product as it is cycled out due to expiry.”).
163. See Dickinson, supra note 74 (noting that at the beginning of the COVID–19
outbreak in the United States, the SNS had about “12 million [N95] masks, and 5
million of these were past their expiration date, leaving the [SNS] with just 7 million
reliable masks”); see also Frieden, supra note 69 (quoting New Hampshire Senator
Maggie Hassan as complaining that many supplies received from the SNS during the
COVID–19 pandemic “were unusable or were expired” and that “[i]t’s not enough to
say we have a stockpile; our stockpile has to be sufficient, and it has to be up to
date”).
164. Alex Finnis, Millions of Pieces of PPE in UK Stockpile Were Out of Date
When Coronavirus Hit, INEWS.CO.UK, https://inews.co.uk/news/health/ppecoronavirus-out-of-date-expired-respirators-masks-covid-19-2847235 (July 13, 2020,
4:29 PM) [https://perma.cc/JKA6-8J4Q] (reporting that “[a]lmost 80 per cent of respirators and more than half of the UK’s supply of facemasks had expired” in the country’s stockpile when the virus outbreak began); Geoff Leo, Depleted National
Stockpile Leaves Canada Reliant on China for Masks, Gowns and Other Supplies During Pandemic, CBC, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/ppe-import-chinashortage-1.5552426 (May 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/RQU2-93BU] (describing the
government-sanctioned widespread use of expired N95 masks from stockpiles in Canada due to shortages and noting that Ottawa officials alone had dumped 2 million
expired N95 masks into a landfill in 2019).
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quantities of many highly rotatable stockpile items simply make consistently rotating such goods an arduous task.165 As former SNS Director Greg Burel noted, it would help if the SNS “had [the] ability to
‘sell off’ stock as it nears its expiration date . . . and invest in new
stock,” but “[r]ight now we don’t have that option.”166
2. Price-Gouging and Commandeering Laws That Weaken
Incentives to Stockpile
Another shortcoming of the existing U.S. stockpiling policy structure is that it often weakens incentives to privately stockpile by capping the prices of essential items during emergencies. As highlighted
above, demand and supply shocks can cause prevailing market prices
for emergency items to temporarily spike during major crises.167 To
combat these effects and deter extortionary behavior, price-gouging
restrictions often kick in during major disasters that provisionally impose price ceilings on sales of emergency goods.168 Some commandeering laws that empower governments to seize privately owned
supplies during disasters can similarly create price ceiling effects by
authorizing governments to compensate citizens and businesses for
seized items based on pre-disaster market prices.169
Most laws that cap the prices of essential goods during crises are
well-intended attempts to address positive externality problems that
might otherwise promote the unjust or inefficient allocation of critical
items.170 Consider, for instance, a nurse at a retirement home facility
that is contemplating whether to purchase her own large supply of
N95 respirator masks during a pandemic so that she can use a new one
each time she comes in physical contact with a different facility resident.171 Frequently using new respirator masks in that setting not only
165. See Frieden, supra note 69 (quoting Rand Corporation senior policy researcher Daniel Gerstein: “[R]otation of stocks is a big deal; it’s a very expensive
process. The federal government is spending about $570 million a year to maintain the
stockpile and restock where necessary.”).
166. Id.
167. See supra discussion accompanying notes 82–84.
168. For additional details on the federal price-gouging restrictions and some statelevel restrictions imposed during the COVID–19 pandemic, see supra notes discussion
accompanying notes 77–80.
169. For specific examples of these types of commandeering laws, see supra discussion accompanying notes 99–106.
170. For a basic introduction to positive externality problems, see generally J.J. Laffont, Externalities, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 192–93
(Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (describing positive externalities); see also Berardi et al., supra note 77.
171. N95 mask shortages have been a major problem for retirement facilities
throughout the country during the COVID–19 pandemic. E.g., Jordan Rau, Nursing
Homes Run Short Of COVID-19 Protective Gear as Federal Response Falters, NPR
(June 11, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/06/11/
875335588/nursing-homes-run-short-of-covid-19-protective-gear-as-federal-responsefalters [https://perma.cc/S66J-HQHC] (citing Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
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better protects the nurse against contracting the virus; it also benefits
every resident in the facility by reducing the odds that the nurse will
spread the disease to others.172 However, because the nurse does not
capture or “internalize” all of these external benefits, she may instead
rationally opt not to buy the masks and to wear less-expensive surgical
masks provided by her employer that provide far less virus protection.173 Temporarily capping the prices of items that are most critical
to slowing the spread of a highly contagious virus can theoretically
mitigate this type of externality problem and thereby promote more
optimal levels of use of these otherwise more expensive items. Such
price restrictions might also promote social justice by making critical
supplies more affordable for socioeconomically disadvantaged
communities.
Unfortunately, laws that impose temporary price ceilings on sales of
essential items during emergencies can also unintentionally weaken ex
ante incentives to engage in efficient levels of voluntary stockpiling. It
is easy to illustrate these distortive effects through numerical examples featuring the same hypothetical hospital featured above. Suppose
that this hospital has a rotatability factor of 1.00 for masks and resides
in a jurisdiction whose laws strictly prohibit sales of the masks at more
than 20% above pre-disaster market prices during an officially declared emergency. Such a restriction would preclude the hospital from
legally selling off any masks it did not need during a crisis at the temporarily crisis-elevated market price (Ve) of $5. Such inability to legally sell off extra masks in that context would reduce the value of Ve
on the right side of Equation (4) above from $5 to as low as $1.20.174
vices records indicating that “711 nursing homes reported having run out of N95
masks, and 1,963 said they had less than a week’s worth” during the COVID–19 pandemic as of June 2020).
172. See Mayo Clinic Staff, How Well Do Face Masks Protect Against
Coronavirus?, MAYO CLINIC (May 18, 2021), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/coronavirus/in-depth/coronavirus-mask/art-20485449 [https://perma.cc/
3AYU-E5WA] (noting that an “[N95 mask] offers more protection than a medical
mask does because it filters out both large and small particles when the wearer inhales”). The CDC has specifically advised healthcare professionals in assisted care
facilities to wear N95 masks when coming into close contact with any resident with a
fever or other symptoms consistent with COVID–19. Considerations for Preventing
Spread of COVID-19 in Assisted Living Facilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/assisted-living.html
(May 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y5DR-D8SY].
173. See Apoorva Mandavilli, Medical Workers Should Use Respirator Masks, Not
Surgical Masks, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/health/masks-surgical-N95-coronavirus.html (June 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/QF4L-X3NS] (describing a
World Health Organization-funded analysis of 172 studies that concluded that “N95
and other respirator masks are far superior to surgical or cloth masks in protecting
essential medical workers against the coronavirus”).
174. To be clear: The precise value of Ve in this example is likely some amount
greater than $1.20 but is difficult to pinpoint because it depends on multiple additional factors. The hospital itself may value the mask for its own internal use during a
crisis at an amount exceeding $1.20. On the other hand, the price-gouging restriction
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Of course, substituting this much lower value for Ve also greatly diminishes the total expected benefit (B) of stockpiling the item. Specifically, this benefit (B)—which was $0.26 per mask when Ve equaled
$5—would become:
(0.05)($1.20) + 0.01
= $0.07.
By shrinking the expected benefit of stockpiling the mask from $0.26
to as low as $0.07, the price-gouging restriction would extinguish the
hospital’s incentive to incur the $0.10 cost (C) of stockpiling it.175
Most commandeering laws can also serve valid public purposes of
helping to efficiently and equitably distribute essential items during
disasters, but if such laws under-compensate citizens for seized goods,
they can similarly reduce Ve and discourage private stockpiling. To illustrate: Suppose that instead of being subject to a price-gouging restriction, our hypothetical hospital resides in a jurisdiction with
commandeering laws. These laws specifically allow the government to
unilaterally acquire essential medical items from private owners during declared emergencies at their pre-emergency price (V0). Suppose
further that there is only a 20% chance the state will exercise this
power against the hospital in a relevant emergency and a corresponding 80% chance the state will not exercise it. Under these revised assumptions, and assuming again that V0 = $1 and Ve = $5, the existence
of this commandeering power would reduce the expected benefit (B)
on the right side of Equation (4) as follows:
(0.20)(0.05)($1.00) + (0.80)(0.05)($5.00) + 0.01
= $0.01 + $0.20 + $0.01
= $0.22.
would protect the hospital from others’ price-gouging and could enable the hospital to
acquire masks at lower prices during an emergency, placing some downward pressure
on the value of Ve. Regardless, the point of the example remains intact: Adding a
price-gouging restriction almost invariably reduces Ve by taking away a stockpiler’s
option to sell off unneeded stockpiled masks during emergencies at much-higher midcrisis prices.
175. As at least one scholar has noted, the disincentivizing effects illustrated in this
numeric example are visible in real-life stockpiling decisions. See, e.g., Russ Roberts,
Price Gouging Could Actually Fix Our Face Mask Shortage, MARKER (May 4, 2020),
https://marker.medium.com/price-gouging-could-actually-fix-our-face-mask-shortagee85abb16b75e [https://perma.cc/V2WA-97SN] (arguing that higher market prices for
scarce items during a disaster “give people an incentive to prepare for the future
because they know that a stockpile is worth a lot in a crisis” while preventing sales at
such prices “discourages people from stockpiling for a future pandemic”).
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As this calculation shows, commandeering laws that under-compensate private owners do reduce the expected benefits of stockpiling but
not as sharply as comparable price-gouging restrictions because of the
possibility that the state will not opt to exercise its commandeering
powers in a relevant crisis.176
Price-gouging restrictions and under-compensating commandeering
laws do not only deter stockpiling before an emergency occurs; they
can also motivate some stockpilers to take actions during crises that
further exacerbate shortages. In particular, such laws can motivate
stockpilers to hoard or hide their inventories of critical goods rather
than selling them into private markets or helping governments to easily commandeer them at artificially low prices. Such laws can also slow
the flow of critical emergency resources to their highest-valued uses
by diluting price signals during crises that might otherwise spur increased production of temporarily scarce goods.177 An ideal stockpiling policy regime would preserve the desirable functions of
commandeering laws and price-gouging restrictions while limiting the
counterproductive side effects of these policies.
3. Diminished Stockpiling Incentives Due to Misconceptions
About the SNS
Yet another downside of the nation’s existing stockpiling policy
structure is its failure to clearly allocate stockpiling-related duties and
privileges among the federal government, states, and the private sector. A misplaced belief that the SNS would distribute as many medical
supplies at pre-disaster prices as any state, city, or hospital might need
during a disaster appeared to further deter many states, cities, and
businesses from adequately stockpiling in the years preceding the
COVID–19 pandemic.178 And although the pandemic proved the fallacy of this presumption, it remains unclear how stockpiling roles are
legally allocated among the federal government, subnational govern176. Specifically, the price-gouging restriction reduced the per-unit expected benefit of stockpiling from $0.26 to $0.07, and the commandeering law merely reduced it
from $0.26 to $0.22. Of course, this example assumed a 20% probability that the government would exercise its commandeering power. Assuming a higher probability
would have strengthened the commandeering law’s deleterious effect.
177. Other commentators writing before and during the pandemic have emphasized this downside of price-gouging restrictions. See, e.g., Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 334 n.115 (2002) (arguing that
an Alabama statute prohibiting sales of essential items at more than 25 percent above
pre-disaster prices “exacerbates a shortage of emergency supplies by encouraging
their depletion for non-emergency uses”); Roberts, supra note 175 (“If you hold
prices down artificially when masks are in high demand, you destroy the financial
incentive to make more masks. You also destroy any incentive to create excess capacity or stockpiles for a future pandemic.”).
178. This confusion over the allocation of stockpiling duties is highlighted in detail
in Part III above. See generally discussion supra Section III.A.1.
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ments, and the private sector—an uncertainty that only further weakens incentives for valuable private stockpiling.179
A false perception that the SNS is ready and able to furnish back-up
supplies as needed distorts stockpiling incentives in ways that are also
frameable within the stockpiling cost-benefit model set forth above.
Specifically, an expectation that the SNS will step in and provide supplies for free or at pre-emergency prices during crises reduces wouldbe stockpilers’ anticipated crisis-period value (Ve) for such items. The
effect of this lower Ve figure is largely the same as the effect of pricegouging restrictions shown above: It decreases the expected benefit
(B) of state, local, and private stockpiling and thus reduces these parties’ incentives to voluntarily stockpile.180
4. Under-Investment in Domestic Supply Chains for LessRotatable Emergency Items
One other major deficiency in the existing U.S. stockpiling policy
structure is its failure to support and preserve the nation’s capacity to
ramp up domestic production of essential goods during crises. The
only cost-effective way to prepare for a long-lasting spike in demand
for a difficult-to-rotate emergency item is to maintain such capacity.
Unfortunately, before the COVID–19 outbreak, most of the ventilators, respirator masks, testing kit supplies, and other relatively difficult-to-rotate medical items that fell into short supply during the
pandemic’s early stages were produced primarily outside the United
States or with internationally sourced materials.181 This reliance on
international supply chains made it difficult for the United States to
quickly ramp up domestic production of these goods.
The country’s longtime dependence on overseas supply chains for
many essential medical items is also attributable to a basic positive
externality problem.182 Would-be domestic manufacturers of emer179. The significant need to clarify the allocation of stockpiling duties among the
federal government, states, and localities was a major point of emphasis during a June
2020 U.S. Senate Committee hearing focused on the SNS. See Frieden, supra note 69
(quoting Senator Ron Johnson as complaining that the name of the SNS is “misleading” because it falsely “implies we’ve got this massive amount of well-thought-out
supplies and we’ve got them adequately stocked to handle a pandemic” and quoting a
senior policy researcher’s assertion that the SNS needs “[a] new mission statement,
codified in law and not subject to the whims of any administration, . . . to signal the
capacities and limits of the SNS”).
180. To review these effects, see generally supra notes 174–75 and accompanying
text.
181. See Keith Bradsher, China Dominates Medical Supplies, in This Outbreak and
the Next, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/05/business/
china-medical-supplies.html?action=click&module=relatedLinks&pgtype=article
[https://perma.cc/BYW4-GUA2] (highlighting China’s majority share of the global
production market for many essential medical items and the potential challenges that
creates for the United States).
182. An externality arises whenever “the activity of one entity . . . directly affects
the welfare of another in a way that is not transmitted by market prices.” Harvey S.
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gency items have historically had no way to fully internalize the
broader “social” benefits of sourcing and producing critical materials
domestically—including that of enabling the country to more quickly
and easily increase domestic manufacturing in response to emergency
shortages. The predictable result of this externality problem has been
suboptimally low levels of private investment in domestic production
capacity for many key emergency items with lower-priced foreign producers largely dominating U.S. markets for these goods.183
Policies that address this positive externality problem and better
sustain adequate domestic supply chains and production capacity for
essential emergency goods are critical to ensuring the nation is prepared for long-lasting global public health crises akin to the
COVID–19 pandemic.184 An ability to swiftly kick-start the manufacture of large quantities of essential goods is crucial in emergencies that
persist for several months and cause worldwide shortages that prompt
other countries to hoard key materials and production equipment for
use within their own borders.185
V.

REFORMING

THE

U.S. STOCKPILING POLICY STRUCTURE

As the COVID–19 crisis made painfully clear, the United States’
existing approach to stockpiling for emergencies has plenty of room
for improvement. The nation’s stockpiles of several highly rotatable
medical items proved to be woefully inadequate during the pandemic’s early phases. These failures have likewise prompted concerns
that the country’s existing policy structure similarly falls short in supRosen, PUBLIC FINANCE 86 (5th ed. 1999). A “positive” externality problem exists
when an activity generates benefits for at least one outside party that are not internalized through market forces by the party or group directly engaged in the activity. See
id.
183. Basic microeconomic theory identifies underproduction as the primary market
failure resulting from positive externalities. See, e.g., Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T.
Leeson, Who’s to Protect Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 473, 479 (2005) (“In the
case of positive externalities, the primary actor does not internalize all benefits of his
action. Theoretically, positive externalities will be undersupplied on the market
. . . .”).
184. The lack of such domestic capacity grew increasingly apparent as the nation
struggled to address supply shortages for certain critical goods several months after
the COVID–19 pandemic began. Benjamin Siegel & Josh Margolin, Doctors, Nurses
Warn of Another Protective Gear Shortage as Coronavirus Surges, ABC NEWS (July
15, 2020, 9:52 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/doctors-nurses-warn-protectivegear-shortage-coronavirus-surges/story?id=71778380 [https://perma.cc/R743-VEFC]
(reporting that FEMA disclosed in July 2020 that the nation’s demand for surgical
isolation “gowns ‘outpaces current U.S. manufacturing capabilities[ ]’ and that there is
no U.S-based manufacturing for synthetic rubber gloves”).
185. Such international hoarding likely hindered the broader global COVID-19
pandemic response. See generally Andrea Shalal, 80 Countries Are Hoarding Medical
Supplies—Here’s Why It Damages the Global Response to COVID-19, WORLD ECON.
F. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/wto-report-80-countrieslimiting-exports-medical-supplies [https://perma.cc/BYC9-2ZHQ].
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porting the public and private stockpiling of food, critical electronics,
certain infrastructure-related materials, and other essential goods.186
Fortunately, many deficiencies currently plaguing the U.S. stockpiling system could be addressed through affordable reforms designed to
better engage the nation’s vast private sector resources in the stockpiling effort. These reforms would ideally supplement rather than replace most existing SNS initiatives and might also help in the buildout
of new U.S. stockpiling programs for food grains and certain other
goods. The following materials outline the details of such potential
reforms and their advantages over the country’s current stockpiling
policy regime.
A. Stockpiling Tax Credits for Rotatable Emergency Supplies
Enacting a new federal income tax credit program to promote the
private stockpiling of rotatable emergency supplies could do much to
cost-effectively expand the nation’s stockpile of these items. As emphasized in Part III above, excessive reliance on the SNS to stockpile
many rotatable medical items has historically generated unnecessary
depreciation costs within the nation’s stockpiling system.187 Private
companies that routinely use or sell large quantities of rotatable emergency supplies are in a far better position than a single centralized
federal agency to offset these costs by maintaining and rotating their
own stockpiles. Many such companies may also be better situated and
incentivized to develop innovations that reduce depreciation costs by
extending the shelf lives of emergency items or putting such items to
alternative uses.
In recent decades, most private medical facilities throughout the
United States have employed “just-in-time” inventory management
methods and thus kept relatively few back-up supplies of emergency
medical items on hand.188 It is hardly surprising that healthcare facilities have embraced these methods, which can often increase net profits by avoiding the depreciation costs, warehousing costs, and
186. See Kirchhoff, supra note 19; see also Weissert, supra note 121 (describing Joe
Biden’s plan to “reinforce stockpiles” of not just medical items but also of “energy
and grid resilience technologies, semiconductors and key electronics, [and] telecommunications infrastructure and raw materials”).
187. See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
188. Yossi Sheffi, Commentary: Solving the Health-Care Equipment Supply
Shortage, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/commentary-solving-the-health-care-equipment-supply-shortage-11586512801 [https://
perma.cc/4YYV-DDJW] (arguing that hospitals’ use of just-in-time inventory principles, which call for “lean inventories and tight connections between companies and
their suppliers,” has made supply chains for many essential medical supplies “vulnerable to unexpected and large-scale disruptions” and citing hospitals’ use of these principles as “one of the main reasons the coronavirus pandemic has crippled health[]care
supply chains”).
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opportunity costs associated with excess inventories.189 Many healthcare facilities have likewise historically seen few emergency preparation advantages in maintaining their own private stockpiles due to
misplaced beliefs that the SNS could step in and furnish scarce supplies during a major disaster.
A well-structured federal income tax credit program could make
private stockpiling a far more appealing investment for high-volume
users and vendors of rotatable emergency supplies. Tax credit programs have a long history of successfully driving targeted types of private investment in other policy areas such as affordable housing and
renewable energy development and could offer similar benefits in the
context of stockpiling policy.190 The COVID–19 pandemic is already
prompting some hospital systems to consider building out their own
medical supply stockpiles.191 Sophisticated software-based systems are
also increasingly available to help heavy users and sellers of medical
items more efficiently rotate their inventories of supplies.192 Introducing a new tax credit program could build on this momentum and motivate healthcare providers and medical goods vendors across the
country to replace just-in-time inventory management methods with
stockpiling activities. As described below, legislators could even design the tax credit program to enable the quick and easy commandeering of essential goods during crises while preserving private
incentives to stockpile.
1. Structuring the Credits to Promote Continuous Stockpiling
The federal renewable energy production tax credit (“PTC”), which
has attracted billions of private investment dollars into U.S. wind en189. See id. (noting that using just-in-time inventory methods “reduces manufacturing and supply chain costs” and that “[w]hen hospital [just-in-time] supply chains run
as advertised, the savings in those costly and high-stakes systems can be substantial”).
190. Rigel C. Oliveri, Vouchers and Affordable Housing: The Limits of Choice in
the Political Economy of Place, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 795, 803 (2019) (describing the federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program, which has existed since its
legislative enactment in 1986 as “[o]ne of the most successful supply-side mechanisms
to increase the amount of affordable housing”); David A. Domansky, The Indefatigable Power of Wind: A Practical Treatment of Development of Development of Wind
Projects, 55 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. INST. 5-1, 5-6 (2009) (calling the federal Production Tax Credit a “key driver of wind project development”).
191. E.g., Alma Gaul, Quad-City Hospitals Feel Secure About PPE Now, MUSCATINE J. (June 20, 2020), https://muscatinejournal.com/news/local/quad-city-hospitalsfeel-secure-about-ppe-now/article_5a6db6e7-e2be-5e95-84e8-4e2fd18e7611.html
[https://perma.cc/LEA5-2PZJ] (quoting a hospital administrator describing how its
hospital system is “creating a 90+ day stockpile of PPE supplies”).
192. Rachel Z. Arndt, Hospital Supply Inventory Management Creating a Cottage
Industry for Technology, MOD. HEALTHCARE (July 28, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180728/TRANSFORMATION02/180729935/
hospital-supply-inventory-management-creating-a-cottage-industry-for-technology
[https://perma.cc/J8WP-4GL3] (describing hospitals’ increasing use of tailored inventory management software).
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ergy development over the past quarter century, is a useful starting
point for designing a new federal stockpiling tax credit (“STC”) program.193 The PTC’s structure enables it to continue incentivizing its
targeted activity for many years into the future. Rather than providing
a single, one-time tax credit based on a taxpayer’s initial investment in
the development of a wind farm, the PTC program awards tax credits
year after year on a cents-per-kilowatt-hour basis to encourage ongoing electricity generation at such projects for at least a decade after
they commence operations.194 A new STC program could similarly
promote continuous stockpiling by awarding income tax credits for
the stockpiling of certain prescribed items on a cents-per-unit-peryear basis. For example, the program might allow an eligible taxpayer
to claim a four-cents-per-year credit for each stockpiled respirator
mask or a six-cents-per-year credit for each stockpiled surgical isolation gown. These credits would directly increase the expected benefit
(B) of stockpiling and thereby promote more voluntary private stockpiling activity in the United States.
Federal legislation creating a new STC program would need to
clearly specify which goods qualify and require that taxpayers claiming credits only use storage facilities and practices that conform to
manufacturers’ recommendations. To limit administrative costs associated with the program, such legislation could likewise require that taxpayers stockpile some minimum quantity of an eligible good to
register for and claim any STCs.195 To certify compliance with the
STC program’s eligibility standards, taxpayers hoping to claim the
STC could be required to submit an application and receive an HHS
“Notice of Registration” before the commencement of any given tax
year to be eligible for credits that year. The HHS, with possible assistance from state health departments, could likewise have statutory authority to audit and inspect private medical stockpiles and issue
penalties for false or fraudulent STC claims.196
193. Certain other types of renewable energy development commenced before the
end of 2020, including closed-loop biomass and geothermal energy projects, also qualified for the PTC as of July 2020. For a detailed primer on the renewable energy
production tax credit program, see generally MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, R43453 THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: IN BRIEF, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 1,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R43453.pdf (Apr. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/82XCZPBR].
194. Id.
195. Such minimum standards might also make it easier during emergencies for
government officials to commandeer large quantities of essential supplies as described
in more detail below. See infra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
196. State agencies have long conducted healthcare facility inspections on behalf of
the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and federal law requires that
reports summarizing violations uncovered during such inspections be made publicly
available. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 401.133 (2011). To explore the Association of
Health Care Journalists’ website providing easy access to many of these reports, see
Search Hospital Inspections, ASS’N HEALTH CARE JOURNALISTS, http://
www.hospitalinspections.org/ (Apr. 2021) [https://perma.cc/9LUY-ZP5P].
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To ensure that registered STC stockpiles are spread geographically
across the country, federal regulators could also issue state-by-state
caps on available STCs for qualifying stockpile items. For decades, an
analogous state-by-state tax credit allocation approach has helped to
promote geographic diversity among projects receiving the federal
low-income housing tax credit.197 Capping the total dollar amounts of
STCs claimable in each state for various items would not only help to
geographically distribute private emergency stockpiles; it would also
make the federal government’s annual cost of funding the STC program more predictable.198 After publicly announcing these caps, the
HHS—again with possible help from state health departments—could
initially approve eligible STC registrants on a first-come, first-served
basis until each state reached its maximum credit allocation. To preserve stockpilers’ investment incentives, those who successfully
claimed credits in the immediately preceding year could thereby qualify for priority when applying to renew their STC registration in the
subsequent year.
2. Calculating the Credits and Their Cost
A simple numerical example helps to illustrate how an STC program could affordably expand the nation’s stockpile of rotatable
emergency supplies. Suppose the HHS has set a target of ensuring that
at least 10 million N95 respirator masks were stockpiled at all times in
the state of Illinois. If the agency were to purchase and store that
quantity of masks within the state on its own or through vendor-managed inventories, the acquisition costs alone would total several million dollars. The HHS would then also have to regularly rotate and
find private buyers for the masks as they aged to avoid depreciation
costs—a task that has historically proven difficult for the agency.199
The federal government could more affordably achieve the same
objective of ensuring that Illinois has 10 million stockpiled N95 masks
using the potential STC program described above. If the STC program
had been enacted and offered credits for stockpiled N95 masks at a
rate of four cents per mask per year, the HHS could pursue its target
197. For basic information about the federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit and
the population-based, state-by-state approach to allocating that credit, see MARK P.
KEIGHTLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT,
CONG. RSCH. SERV. 1–2, 4, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS22389
[https://perma.cc/9LJX-X2K4].
198. For instance, if Congress has allocated $660 million to STC program for an
upcoming year and the total U.S. population were 330 million, there would be roughly
$2.00 per citizen available to fund the program. HHS could easily use this $2.00 figure
to calculate state-by-state STC caps such that a state with 5 million citizens qualified
for up to $10 million in total credits. The agency could then further delineate which
specific proportions of that total available allocation are available for stockpiling N95
masks, isolation gowns, shoe covers, and the like.
199. These challenges in rotating SNS-owned supplies are described in detail above.
See supra Section III.A.2.
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of 10 million masks by making $400,000 in STCs available to taxpayers
for stockpiling N95 masks in the state. The HHS could then award
these credits on a first-come, first-served basis to taxpayers who met
specific registration criteria. Limits on the number of tax credits any
one taxpayer could claim in a state could further help to ensure that
registered STC stockpiles are owned by a diverse collection of taxpayers and are geographically distributed throughout each state. Most
STC registrants would presumably be medical goods vendors or
healthcare companies capable of more easily offsetting depreciation
costs associated with their stockpiles through consistent rotation
practices.
Calculating a taxpayer’s earned STCs for any given year and type of
item would be a relatively simple exercise. If, for example, an Illinois
hospital had successfully registered to claim STCs for storing 500,000
masks in a given year, multiplying this quantity by the $0.04 annual
per-unit tax credit amount would yield income tax credits totaling
$20,000. If the hospital were to store each registered mask for four
years before rotating it out for in-house use before it expired, the hospital would be able to claim a total of $0.16 for storing it over that
four-year period—a significant cost savings given that the wholesale
price for such masks is typically less than $1.
Although an STC program would certainly require new federal government expenditures, those relatively modest expenditures could be
a worthwhile and cost-effective means of better equipping the country
for future crises. In the years leading up to the COVID–19 pandemic,
the federal government’s annual funding of the SNS was in the range
of $500 million to $600 million per year.200 By comparison, the U.S.
Department of Defense’s proposed 2020 budget was $718 billion—
more than one thousand times larger than historic annual SNS budgets.201 Modestly increasing federal stockpiling budgets through programs such as a new STC would seem a comparatively small price to
pay to safeguard American lives especially in light of the fact that as
of September 2021, roughly 645,000 U.S. citizens had died from
COVID–19.202
200. Doug Palmer, U.S. Medical Stockpile Wasn’t Built to Handle Current Crisis,
Former Director Says, POLITICO (Apr. 8, 2020, 2:53 PM) https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/04/08/national-stockpile-coronavirus-crisis-175619 [https://perma.cc/N2B2VKFJ] (reporting that the SNS annual budget “ranged around $500 million to $600
million” under the Obama administration and that the “Trump [A]dministration initially followed that pattern, requesting $575 million for the stockpile for both fiscal
2018 and 2019”).
201. See Long-Term Implications of the 2020 Future Years Defense Program, CONG.
BUDGET OFF. (Aug. 2019), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55500 [https://perma.cc/
Y7WC-6MJZ].
202. John Elflein, Total Number of Cases and Deaths from Coronavirus (COVID19) in the United States as of September 4, 2021, STATISTA (Sept. 6, 2021), https://
www.statista.com/statistics/1101932/coronavirus-covid19-cases-and-deaths-number-usamericans/ [https://perma.cc/9N66-59WE].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL102.txt

102

unknown

Seq: 54

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

15-NOV-21

13:18

[Vol. 9

B. Special Commandeering Rules for STC-Registered Stockpiles
Because the STC program just described would rely on private parties to own and store far more of the nation’s emergency stockpiles, it
would also rely more on commandeering powers during major crises
to aid the government’s redistribution of STC-registered items to
those in greatest need. Unfortunately, as highlighted above, private
stockpilers who believe they will be under-compensated for seized
goods under commandeering laws may be motivated to hide or hoard
critical supplies during emergencies.203 Such under-compensating
commandeering laws can also deter private stockpiling altogether by
reducing the expected benefits of stockpiling activities.204
As outlined below, one way to support the increased use of commandeering powers under an STC program while mitigating the distortive effects of commandeering laws would be to require that
governments pay enhanced compensation when seizing STC-registered items. The program’s enabling legislation could also limit the
hoarding and hiding of items during crises by authorizing heavy penalties for taxpayers who failed to promptly make STC-registered items
available after a commandeering request. And certain other legislative
provisions described below might even clarify the allocation of stockpiling-related duties and privileges between states and the federal
government.
1. Requiring Enhanced Compensation for Seized Goods
Congress could mitigate the adverse effects of commandeering laws
on private stockpiling by requiring that governments pay enhanced,
stipulated compensation—such as triple an item’s pre-disaster fair
market value—when commandeering STC-registered supplies. Such
an enhanced compensation requirement would increase Ve and improve the net benefits of private stockpiling, thereby further strengthening stockpiling incentives. An enhanced compensation requirement
could also make STC-registered stockpilers more willing to cooperate
with commandeering actions during crises, enabling governments to
more swiftly locate and procure essential supplies when they are
needed most. If STC registrants were required to report their per-unit
prices paid for STC-registered goods during the registration process,
such a rule could also reduce disputes over the compensation due for
commandeered items.
Although an enhanced compensation requirement for STC-registered stockpile items would provide compensation in excess of what
203. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
204. The threat of commandeering with under-compensation reduces V0, diminishing the expected benefits of stockpiling and thereby weakening incentives to privately
stockpile. This adverse effect of commandeering laws on private stockpiling is explained in detail in Part III above. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
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stockpilers paid for seized items, this approach would likely be defensible as “just compensation” under the Takings Clause. Given that
there were price spikes of 800% or higher for certain emergency
goods during the COVID–19 pandemic, some might argue that stipulating even triple compensation for commandeered items could actually under-compensate some private stockpilers in severe crises.205
However, a rule requiring triple compensation would be far more
“just” than the pre-disaster-price-based compensation approach employed in some jurisdictions. And there is plenty of precedential support for statutory provisions requiring compensation at more than
100% of fair value in special situations.206
Congress could even enact provisions in its STC program enabling
legislation that empowers the HHS, FEMA, or other federal agencies
to unleash STC-registered private stockpiles into the marketplace
without ever exercising commandeering powers. For instance, such
provisions could authorize the HHS during a major emergency to issue notices temporarily authorizing private stockpilers in certain crisis-affected states or counties to use or sell specified percentages of
certain STC-registered supplies without any tax penalty. These notices
could even exempt such sales from any relevant price-gouging restrictions so long as sale prices stayed below the STC program’s stipulated
triple-compensation amounts. This type of alternative emergency response strategy could facilitate the speedy injection of much-needed
supplies into targeted markets during disasters, thereby easing
shortages and enabling federal agencies to allocate more governmentowned resources to the hardest-hit or most under-privileged
communities.
2. Clarified Federal and State Government Roles
Certain other rules capable of being integrated into a new STC program could clarify the allocation of stockpile-related roles and privileges between states and the federal government. For example, the
program’s enabling legislation could expressly preempt states’ use of
commandeering powers to seize STC-registered items without express
federal authorization. Armed with such preemptive powers, the federal government would have discretion to temporarily delegate lim205. See supra discussion accompanying note 82.
206. So long as recitals in the federal legislation effectively articulate the rationale
for providing reasonably enhanced stipulated compensation, such approach would
likely not violate the Takings Clause “just” compensation requirement. Multiple state
statutes have long authorized compensation of up to 150% fair market value for certain types of property. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 523.001(2), 523.039 (2006) (authorizing 125% eminent domain compensation for qualifying properties to account for the
“heritage” value). For a detailed review of state laws authorizing or requiring compensation exceeding fair market value, see generally Maria M. Maciá, Pinning Down
Subjective Valuations: A Well-Being-Analysis Approach to Eminent Domain, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. 945, 950–56 (2016).
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ited commandeering authority to targeted states and only as to certain
specific STC items during emergencies. These temporary delegations
could additionally require that states use the same enhanced triplecompensation terms that would apply if a federal agency were commandeering the items.
Another plausible way to clarify state and federal government
stockpiling roles through STC program legislation would be to make
certain STC-related powers hinge on official declarations of state or
national emergencies.207 For example, the STC program’s enabling
legislation could provide that if a state government has officially declared an emergency within its boundaries but the federal government
has not declared a national emergency, the state is temporarily empowered to commandeer STC-registered items within its borders as
needed at the federal program’s stipulated compensation rates. The
legislation could then further provide that if the federal government
declares a national emergency, states’ commandeering powers over
STC-registered supplies automatically terminate, and states can thus
commandeer only non-STC-registered items or seek to purchase supplies directly from the SNS.
An STC program’s enabling legislation could even encourage state
and city governments to invest more into maintaining their own public
stockpiles through provisions that more clearly protect such stockpiles
from federal commandeering. Reports of such federal commandeering of state government supplies surfaced during early stages of
the COVID–19 crisis.208 In the absence of statutory protections
against these actions, the threat that a federal agency might seize subnational government stockpiles and under-compensate for them
reduces Ve for states and municipalities and thus deters these entities’
incentives to stockpile. Simple statutory language that expressly
shields state- and city-owned emergency stockpiles from federal commandeering powers could easily eliminate this threat and thus encourage more subnational government stockpiling.
C. Maintaining Domestic Supply Chains for Essential Supplies
In addition to all the reforms just described, one other category of
federal government support seems essential to developing a reliable
U.S. stockpiling structure: policies that subsidize the buildout and
207. State governments and some municipal governments have power to declare an
official state of emergency within their jurisdictions, and certain federal government
officials have similar powers to declare national emergencies. See James G. Hodge, Jr.
& Kim Weidenaar, Public Health Emergencies as Threats to National Security, 9 J.
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 81, 82–83 (2017).
208. E.g., Polly Mosendz, Governors Consider Consortium to Skirt FEMA Dysfunction (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 9, 2020, 6:46 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
coronavirus/governors-consider-supply-consortium-to-skirt-fema-dysfunction [https://
perma.cc/WLQ6-WCL7] (reporting that “[i]n an effort to restock, FEMA has been
commandeering supplies from states”).
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maintenance of domestic supply chains for many emergency items.
Sustaining the nation’s capacity to swiftly ramp up high-volume domestic production is particularly crucial for those essential goods that
are difficult to rotate or are susceptible to prolonged shortages during
drawn-out crises.
Relying solely on fully rotatable stockpiles is seldom a viable stockpiling strategy for emergency items with low rotatability factors.209 For
these difficult-to-rotate goods, policymakers generally must supplement rotatable stockpiling with two additional strategies: (1) maintaining some non-rotatable stockpiles with contents that are regularly
discarded and replaced as they expire and (2) otherwise sustaining the
domestic capacity to quickly produce large quantities of these items in
the event of a prolonged shortage.
Certain types of non-rotatable supplies, such as nerve agent antidotes, are needed so immediately after a crisis hits that merely having
the ability to rapidly kickstart the production of them is not acceptable emergency preparation.210 For these goods, the SNS’s existing
practice of centrally stockpiling enough to support an initial emergency response is probably the only acceptable approach despite its
relatively high net cost.
For most other difficult-to-rotate emergency goods, however, the
most cost-effective stockpiling strategy may be to maintain domestic
supply chains capable of supporting high-volume production of such
items on short notice. A wide variety of policy strategies are capable
of sustaining these domestic supply chains. As highlighted in Part III
above, some federal legislators have recently floated proposals calling
for federal ownership and control of domestic supply chains for certain essential goods.211 In contrast, some others have proposed policies that would incentivize private companies to build out and
maintain these supply chains on U.S. soil.212 Because they leverage
market forces, these private-sector-focused policies would likely be
more cost-effective.
209. To review what constitutes a “rotatability factor” and how it is measured, see
generally supra discussion accompanying notes 138–29.
210. The CDC website advises that two common types of nerve agent antidotes
“must be administered within minutes to a few hours (depending on the agent) following exposure to be effective.” Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health,
SARIN (GB): Nerve Agent, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 12,
2011), https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ershdb/emergencyresponsecard_29750001.html#:~:
text=ANTIDOTE%3A%20Atropine%20and%20pralidoxime%20chloride,injections
%20of%202%2DPAM%20Cl [https://perma.cc/QXV4-RNUR].
211. See supra discussion accompanying notes 116–118.
212. Frieden, supra note 69 (quoting former SNS Director Greg Burel as arguing
that the federal government has a “responsibility to expand public private partnerships so we can understand what it’s going to take to get the private sector to come
back and do more manufacturing” and noting Senator Rob Portman’s frustration that
the federal government “doesn’t seem to be doing the obvious things to re-shore our
PPE . . . .”).
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It may even be possible to incentivize the maintenance of domestic
supply chains for targeted emergency items by adding additional features to the possible STC program described above. For instance, provisions in the STC program’s enabling legislation could require STC
registrants to certify during registration that a specified minimum percentage of their stockpiled inventories of qualifying goods were fully
sourced and manufactured in the United States.213 These minimum
required percentages of domestically sourced goods could then gradually increase over time according to a prescribed schedule, generating
predictable market demand growth and thereby helping to support
greater private investment in domestic supply chains for targeted
items.214
A separate “domestic manufacturing investment tax credit program” comparable to the highly successful investment tax credit program for solar energy development is another plausible strategy for
driving the private development of domestic supply chains for hardto-rotate emergency goods.215 This type of program, which actually
appeared in some form in a 2020 Senate bill entitled the “Restoring
Critical Supply Chains and Intellectual Property Act,” would award
income tax credits for qualifying private investments in domestic supply chain development activities involving certain prescribed emergency goods.216 Unfortunately, as of early 2021, Congress had not yet
enacted this bill nor multiple other proposed bills aimed at supporting
domestic supply chains for emergency medical goods,217 and the re213. Existing “Made in the USA” certification standards, including some promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission, could assist in the development of such requirements for stockpiled goods. See Lisa Smith, What It Takes to Be ‘Made in the
USA’, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/12/made-inthe-usa.asp (Aug. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/W5QD-4AR9].
214. Such gradual increasing of standards over time is a common regulatory strategy for promoting continued innovation in a particular area. The federal vehicle fuel
economy standards are one example of a use of this approach. See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174, 24,175–76 (Apr. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 86 and 600) (increasing fuel economy standards by 1.5% per year through
the year 2026).
215. See Fact Sheet: Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), SOLAR ENERGY INDUS.
ASS’N (Jan. 2020), https://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/SEIA-ITC-Factsheet-2020-Jan_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/74PC-N3AW] (“[T]he U.S. solar energy industry has grown by more than 10,000%” since enactment of the Solar Investment Tax
Credit in 2006.).
216. Restoring Critical Supply Chains and Intellectual Property Act, S. 4324, 116th
Cong. § 48D (2020) (authorizing a 30% income tax credit for eligible investments in
domestic PPE manufacturing development projects).
217. See Chris Galford, U.S. Sens. Portman, Peters Introduce Bill to Demand LongTerm Contracts for American-Made PPE, HOMELAND PREPAREDNESS NEWS (Apr.
26, 2021), https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/67444-u-s-sens-portman-peters-introduce-bill-to-demand-long-term-contracts-for-american-made-ppe/ [https://
perma.cc/D4CS-4UWT] (describing the proposed “Make PPE in America Act” and
“U.S. Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Review Act”).
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sulting policy uncertainty was again threatening the long-term stability
of that industry.218
Regardless of how Congress opts to support the maintenance of domestic supply chains for difficult-to-rotate emergency items, it could
further bolster this effort by also supporting more public and private
research focused on increasing the rotatability of emergency goods.
Any new innovation that extends the shelf life of an emergency item
directly increases that item’s rotatability factor, thereby reducing its
net per-unit stockpiling cost and strengthening incentives to stockpile
it.219 Federally funded programs focused on finding valuable alternative uses for difficult-to-rotate goods could similarly reduce net stockpiling costs for these items.220
VI.

CONCLUSION

The COVID–19 pandemic exposed major deficiencies in the U.S.
stockpiling policy structure and prompted widespread calls for reform.
As helpful as the SNS and other existing U.S. stockpiling efforts were
during the first few months of the U.S. COVID–19 outbreak, they
were ultimately unable to equip the nation’s healthcare professionals
to safely and effectively fight the virus. The consequences of these
failures took a devastating toll as shortages of medical protective gear
and testing materials hindered the nation’s response to an unprecedented national crisis.
Fortunately, affordable policy reforms are available that could ensure the United States is much better prepared for future emergencies. As the simple cost-benefit model employed in this Article shows,
the nation’s present stockpiling approach fails to incentivize private
companies to stockpile even though many businesses could be cost218. See Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Manufacturers Warn U.S. Must Do More to
Maintain Fragile PPE Production, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.ft.com/
content/c04571c0-69d9-49a6-b1a0-40a6cfa892fe [https://perma.cc/5V22-GVUW].
219. For instance, an innovation that doubled the shelf life (N) of a respirator mask
from five years to ten years in the hypothetical hospital example from Part III would
have increased its rotatability factor from 0.25 to 0.50. See supra discussion accompanying notes 127–28. Innovations that would allow emergency responders to replace
disposable high-use items with reusable versions can have similar effects. See, e.g.,
Anne Trafton, Engineers Design a Reusable, Silicone Rubber Face Mask, MIT NEWS
(July 9, 2020), http://news.mit.edu/2020/reusable-silicone-rubber-face-mask-0709
[https://perma.cc/X6XU-XFT6] (describing MIT researchers’ development of a respirator mask that, unlike typical N95 masks, is “designed to be easily sterilized and used
many times”).
220. For example, stockpiled respirator masks that are approaching expiration
might be usable as ordinary surgical masks or have suitable alternative uses in other
industries such as building construction. See, e.g., Peter Grant, COVID-19 Face
Masks: A Survey of US Construction Companies, SAFESITE (May 1, 2020), https://
safesitehq.com/face-masks-construction-survey/ [https://perma.cc/CVF7-YANZ]
(describing how certain types of N95 masks that are not suitable for protection against
COVID-19 may provide “the first wave of affordable resupply for construction companies working around hazardous dust”).
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effective and meaningful contributors to the national stockpiling effort. In particular, the federal government’s highly centralized stockpiling system—which was originally designed for storing non-rotatable
pharmaceuticals—is poorly suited for storing many highly-rotatable
items that could more efficiently be stockpiled in the private sector. A
new federal stockpiling tax credit program and the other potential
policy changes advocated in this Article could help to remedy these
deficiencies by leveraging private resources to support a more robust,
resilient national stockpiling system. In the wake of the nation’s worst
public health crisis in over a century, there has arguably never been a
more opportune time to reshape U.S. stockpiling policies. Enacting
bold reforms now could help to ensure that the nation is far better
equipped to respond the next time disaster strikes.

